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i 
Abstract 
 In this thesis, I address two puzzles regarding Japan’s security policy: (1) its minimalist 
military posture despite its economic power during the Cold War and (2) the recent shift from 
this minimalist security policy to an assertive one marked by a strengthening of its international 
security role and military. I argue that although many IR scholars, mainly from the realist camp, 
claim that the formation of the original security policy (puzzle 1) and subsequent transformation 
(puzzle 2) is driven by the state’s rational response to external conditions in the international 
security environment, it can more adequately be explained by the complex dynamics of internal 
contestation among “identity groups” with different visions of Japan’s national identity and 
interest. 
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1 
Introduction 
Japan has always been an intriguing case for scholars of International Relations (IR). 
Despite its devastating defeat in the Second World War, the country successfully transformed 
itself into the world’s second-largest economy. Observing this economic rise, Kenneth Waltz, one 
of the founding fathers of neorealist theory, asserted that the economic powerhouse would 
necessarily become a great power by acquiring military capabilities, including a nuclear arsenal, 
to secure itself and advance its interests in the self-help milieu of the anarchic international 
system.
1
 Contradicting this predicted rational course of action, however, the “economic giant” 
remained a “military dwarf” with a relatively small Self-Defense Force and reliance on the 
United States for its national security. For Waltz, the country was a “structural anomaly,”2 and 
scholars have since attempted to explain Japan’s “irrational” security policy.3 In short, Japan 
constitutes a “puzzle” for many IR experts. 
More recently, this puzzle has been complicated by Japan’s shift to a more “normal” 
security posture with a strengthening of its international security role and military since the end 
of the Cold War. Japan has participated in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) since the early 
1990s and in the war on terror at the beginning of the twenty-first century while investing in 
advanced weaponry and even moving toward a revision of Article IX of its constitution, the 
famous “peace article,” in which the state renounced war forever. For realists, this transformation 
from the previous passive security policy to the new, more assertive one embodies a rational 
response to the changing post-Cold War security environment. In their accounts, the new 
                                                 
1
 Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18 (1993): 44-79. 
2
 Ibid., 66. 
3
 Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1996); 
Peter Kazenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1996); Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); and Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism (London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998). 
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post-Cold War security challenges, including the Gulf War, the War on Terror, North Korea’s 
nuclear and missile crises, and China’s rapid military expansion, have finally led the “anomalous” 
nation to embrace increased realism in its foreign policy and to become a muscular, “normal” 
nation.
4
 And yet, a question still remains as to why these policy changes are occurring at this 
precise moment in history. There were numerous occasions during the Cold War that might have 
triggered such policy changes. Moreover, we also have to account for the specific character of 
Japan’s recent transformation, which is not full-blown rearmament including nuclear capabilities 
leading the state to become a great military power as realists would expect. The recent shift in 
Japan’s security policy remains another, second puzzle for scholars of IR. 
 In this thesis, I address these two puzzles regarding Japan’s security policy. I argue that 
although many IR scholars, mainly from the realist camp, claim that the formation of the original 
security policy (puzzle 1) and subsequent transformation (puzzle 2) is driven by the state’s 
rational response to external conditions in the international security environment, it can more 
adequately be explained by the complex dynamics of internal contestation among “identity 
groups” with different visions of Japan’s national identity and interest. This contestation among 
competing identity groups, I claim, reached its peak in the aftermath of the Second World War 
when Japan was reconstructing its identity and state structure, and has emerged in the aftermath 
of the end of the Cold War as the state is exposed to the new security challenges that compel it to 
reconsider its existing identity.  
 These two pivotal moments of identity construction, during which Japan’s existing 
identity became no longer sustainable and the urgent need to construct a new identity emerged, 
are what I call an “identity crisis.” This crisis has led Japan to replace its long-held existing 
                                                 
4
 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Re-Emergence as a "Normal" Military Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004); and id., Japan's Remilitarisation (Oxon, U.K.: Routledge 
for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009). 
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identity in favor of a novel one and undergo an “identity shift.” In each of these identity 
crises—the first in the aftermath of the World War II, and the second after the end of the Cold 
War—there were multiple different identity groups, domestic political camps that have their own 
distinct visions of national identity and interest, or what I call “part-identities.” These groups 
underwent political contestation in determining the content of the new state identity as a whole, 
or what I call a “whole-identity.” Through the contestation, a dominant, or hegemonic, identity 
group emerged and incorporated perspectives of other subordinate groups, constructing a 
whole-identity that can be best described as a “mosaic” of multiple discourses. 
 I argue that there were three part-identities—pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist—at 
work during the first identity crisis at the beginning of the postwar period. The outcome of this 
contestation was that the mercantilist camp won the prime minister’s office, incorporated the 
pacifist principles into its foreign policy, and presented the state as a “merchant nation” and a 
“peace nation” under the Yoshida Doctrine, a grand strategy comprising both mercantilism and 
pacifism. This doctrine (1) prioritized economic development, (2) minimized the state’s defense 
spending and international security role, and (3) led the state to rely on the U.S. for its security. 
This doctrine ultimately set Japan on the path to becoming an economic power without 
simultaneously becoming a great military power.  
 However, the new security challenges that emerged after the end of the Cold War 
convinced domestic political actors that the existing state identity was no longer sustainable. The 
sudden collapse of a financial bubble in 1991 and the subsequent “lost decade” of economic 
stagnation also attacked the self-confidence of the merchant nation. The extant mercantilist 
identity evolved into a new part-identity, internationalist, and another new part-identity, 
normalist, emerged in the place of the revisionist, while the pacifist identity group faded away 
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from the political front. Because of these changes, Japan is currently undergoing a second 
identity crisis, in which the normalist camp has emerged as the new hegemonic identity, while 
incorporating elements of the internationalist discourse in a subordinate fashion. This new 
dynamic of Japan’s security discourse is effectively shifting its whole-identity to one that 
characterizes Japan as a “normal nation” with a greater international security role and military 
capabilities, and also as a “global civilian power” emphasizing its use of force for humanitarian 
noncombat missions to promote world’s peace and security. Because Japan still has no desire to 
aggressively pursue its national interest or send its force for combat missions across the globe, 
the new security policy and identity are significantly more nuanced than pure militant realism 
would anticipate. 
 In addition to decoding the two puzzles surrounding Japan’s security policy, I will seek 
to contribute to the broader IR debate about theoretical paradigms and policy analysis. On the 
theory front, I will present the model of state identity construction via the contestation among 
competing identity groups as a causal mechanism between changes in the international security 
environment (exogenous shocks) and the identity shift (endogenous change). This mechanism 
takes the form of a holistic constructivist analytical perspective and offers an avenue through 
which systemic and unit-level constructivism can interact. I also demonstrate how the “mosaic” 
picture of identity presented by this model complicates the dominant assumption in all paradigms 
of IR, namely that state actors are monolithic entities with coherent sets of interests. On the 
policy front, I suggest that a deeper understanding of the complexity underlying nation-state 
identity could reveal the direction of Japan’s security policy discourse. In other words, 
understanding identity not only helps us make sense of past policies but also puts us in a better 
position to predict the potential future trajectory of Japanese policymaking. 
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 The following chapters discuss these points in greater depth. Chapter Two begins by 
reviewing the existing literature on Japanese security policy and identifying the flaws in the 
arguments that need to be addressed. It then lays out a theoretical framework for my analysis of 
identity construction while explaining how my approach differs from existing ones, and aspects 
of state behavior that IR scholars have largely neglected. The framework defines identity in a 
way that helps explain more thoroughly how identity construction processes occur both 
domestically and internationally, involving contestation among multiple identity groups, 
producing identity as a mosaic of multiple discourses, and determining states’ interests and 
security policy frameworks.  
 Chapter Three addresses the two puzzles of Japanese security policy in the following 
three sections. The first section decodes the first puzzle—the state’s minimalist security policy 
despite its economic might during the Cold War. It analyzes the first identity crisis at the end of 
the Second World War and delineates how Japan came to foster a pacifist, mercantilist identity 
and aspire to become an economic power rather than a great military power. The next two 
sections decipher the second puzzle—the transformation of Japan’s passive security policy after 
the Cold War. This second section examines Japan’s second identity crisis in the post-Cold War 
era and how this crisis resulted in the recent developments in Japan’s security policy. Specifically, 
this section discusses the emergence of the normalist and internationalist identities during 1990s 
and political takeover of power by the normalist in the twenty-first century. The last section of 
the chapter focuses on the most recent developments in Japan’s identity and security policy after 
the 2009 election, in which the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) ended the Liberal Democratic 
Party’s half-a-century-long domination (LDP) of Japanese politics. This section illustrates the 
continuity of the normalist policy agenda implemented by the previous LDP administrations 
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despite the DPJ’s attempts to form a new security policy.  
 Chapter Four discusses the theoretical implications of this thesis. In this section, I seek 
to contribute to the broader IR literature by exploring how my model of identity construction can 
intervene in existing theoretical paradigms. Chapter Five suggests the potential trajectory of 
Japanese security policy by consulting what I establish in earlier chapters about the state’s 
identity and interests. Chapter Six, the concluding part of the thesis, summarizes the argument 
and proposes questions and problems for which future research is needed. 
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Theoretical Framework 
 In this chapter, I lay out the theoretical framework to analyze Japan’s identity 
construction and security policy during the two identity crises. In forming this framework, I 
begin by consulting Rawi Abdelal et al.’s depictions of the “content” and “contestation” of 
identity. Later, I go on to combine this analytical frame with Kai Schulze’s “levels of identity” 
which comprise the whole-identity and part-identity of nation-states. Before doing so, I will 
briefly review the existing literature and describe why I employ the constructivist methodology 
and how my approach is unique. 
 
Literature Review 
This section reviews how the existing literature on Japan’s security policy has attempted 
to answer two puzzles: Japan’s minimalist military posture despite the state’s economic power 
during the Cold War (puzzle 1) and its recent transformation after the Cold War (puzzle 2). 
Specifically, I map out the discussion among realists, liberals, and constructivists and ultimately 
side with the constructivist approach while simultaneously identifying its limits, which my 
theoretical framework attempts to overcome. 
 There is rich existing literature by IR scholars, including realists, liberals, and 
constructivists, that explores Japan’s security policy. For neorealists such as Christopher Layne 
and Kenneth Waltz, Japan’s disproportionate military power relative to its renowned economic 
growth and strength is an enigma. They expect economic powerhouses like Japan to transform 
themselves into great powers by acquiring military capabilities, including a nuclear arsenal, in 
order to secure themselves and advance their interests in the self-help milieu of the anarchic 
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international system.
5
 To neorealists, the country is a “structural anomaly.”6 
 In response to this enigma—the gap between Japan’s economic might and minimalist 
military posture, and the first “puzzle” regarding the state’s security policy—a new generation of 
realists has offered varyingly persuasive accounts by introducing different tenets of realist 
thought. Jennifer Lind, a defensive realist, contends that the conduct of Japan’s passive post-war 
security policy is consistent with the strategy of “buck-passing,” a balancing strategy that does as 
little of the required balancing as possible by relying on the efforts of others.
7
 Eric Heginbotham 
and Richard Samuels argue that Japan’s foreign policy is consistent with “mercantilist realism,” 
which “recognizes technoeconomic security interests…as central considerations of state policy,” 
based on the idea that technology and national wealth are as important as military power in 
maintaining the state’s security standing as they increase the state’s political leverage and 
independence.
8
 Postclassical realist Tsuyoshi Kawasaki contends that Japan’s security policy is 
“no puzzle for realism,” and explains that states maximize their security without threatening 
others with a security dilemma, all the while being highly sensitive to the economic costs of 
defense.
9
 By emphasizing different aspects of the security apparatus, these scholars, with new 
–isms in the realist thought, have provided various accounts of Japanese security policy. 
Whereas realists are primarily concerned with security issues, liberals like Richard 
Rosecrance emphasize economic considerations and argue that Japan’s foreign policy centers on 
commercial interests rather than security ones. In his account, the country has been simply 
following the logic of economic rationality as a “trading state,” or, in former Prime Minister 
                                                 
5
 Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion,” International Security 17 (1993): 5-51; Kenneth Waltz, “Emergent 
Structure,” 44-79. 
6
 Kenneth Waltz, “Emerging Structure,” 66. 
7
 Jennifer M. Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?” International Security 29 (2004): 92-121. 
8
 Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” International 
Security 22 (1998): 171-203. 
9
 Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” The Pacific Review 14 (2001): 221-40. 
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Yoshida Shigeru’s own terms, a “merchant nation” (shonin kokka).10 The underlying assumption 
is that the free-trade system allows states to transform their positions through economic growth 
rather than through military conquest. Rosecrance argues that the post-1945 “‘trading world’ of 
international relations offers the possibility of escaping…a vicious cycle [of warfare and 
following interludes] and finding new patterns of cooperation among national states.”11 In this 
new world of cooperation, he contends, “[s]tates, as Japan has shown, can do better through a 
strategy of economic development based on trade than they are likely to do through military 
intervention in the affairs of other nations.”12 
 Whereas both realists and liberals focus almost exclusively on material factors such as 
the distribution of military and economic power when explicating Japan’s security policy, 
constructivists like Thomas Berger and Peter Kazenstein employ an ideationalist approach in 
which they emphasize the roles of ideas, culture, norms, and identity. Claiming that domestic 
and international experiences of states generate societal norms that limit the possible policies the 
nation’s leaders can select from, they argue that Japan has fostered norms against war, or what 
they call a “culture of antimilitarism,” coming out of military defeat in World War II.13 
Constructivists rely on such ideational factors for their explanation for the nation’s low military 
profile and passive security policy (puzzle 1). According to Berger, any attempt by the state “to 
significantly expand…[the] Japanese defense establishments and international roles foundered 
on the shoals of domestic opposition”14 due to the antimilitarist norms embedded in public 
discourse. 
                                                 
10
 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: 
Basic Books, 1986). 
11
 Ibid., ix. 
12
 Ibid., ix. 
13
 Peter Kazenstein, Cultural Norms; Thomas Berger, “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and 
Japan,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics, ed. by Peter Kazenstein (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 317-56; and id., Cultures of Antimilitarism. 
14
 Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, 6. 
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 In these attempts to answer the first puzzle of Japan’s security policy—its minimalist 
military posture despite its economic might—the ideationalists seem be able to provide a more 
satisfying account than the materialists. The materialist scholars such as realists and liberals, on 
the one hand, base their analysis on a rational actor, interest-based approach. They regard the 
states as unitary, calculating actors who seek to maximize their interests following the logic of 
military or economic expediency.
15
 In doing so, materialists, or rationalists, assume that interests 
are “exogenous to social interaction” and, thus, actors (be they individuals or states) enter social 
relations with a “pre-existing set of preferences.”16 The material conditions of the international 
structure determine a state’s behavior as states are essentially pursing a given set of interests. As 
Robert O. Keohane observes, “the link between system structure and actor behavior is forged by 
the rationality assumption, which enables the theorist to predict that leaders will respond to the 
incentives and constraints imposed by their environments. Taking rationality as a constant 
permits one to attribute variations in state behavior to various characteristics of the international 
system.”17 Yet by doing so, realists and liberals cannot adequately elucidate the causes for 
variances in states’ behavior despite facing similar material conditions.18 Nor can they fully 
explain state behavior that appears similar, but is in fact constituted by different meanings than 
those posited by rationalist theories of IR. This is why Japan remains a “structural anomaly” to 
neorealists as its limited military posture does not support their argument that the anarchic 
international structure compels economic powers like Japan to become military powers in order 
                                                 
15
 Vivien A. Schmidt, “Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive 
Institutionalism as the Fourth ‘New Institutionalism,’” European Political Science Review 2 (2010): 5. 
16
 Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” in Theories in International Relations Third Edition, ed. Scott Burchill et 
al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 197. 
17
 Robert O. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New 
York: Columbia University Press), 167. 
18
 Bhubhindar Singh, “Japan’s Security Policy: From a Peace State to an International State,” The Pacific Review 
21(2008): 305. 
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to secure themselves in such a self-help system.
19
 
In response to this criticism, neorealists might still point to the recent shift in the 
nation’s security policy during the post-Cold War era—the second “puzzle” regarding the 
policy—to justify their claim. In fact, some realists regarded the end of the Cold War as the last 
barrier for Japan to fully remilitarize.
20
 In Japan’s Reluctant Realism, Michael Green argued as 
early as 2001 that Japan is “reluctantly” embracing increased realism in its foreign policy.21 In 
short, Japan has finally become a muscular, “normal” nation.22 In this regard, realists do succeed 
to some degree in predicting the direction of the policy and thus addressing the second puzzle, 
though the recent change in the policy is nowhere near their image of a fully remilitarized Japan 
equipped with nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, realist explanations do not illustrate why the 
state decided to redirect its course at this precise moment, but not at other occasions during the 
Cold War such as during the Korean War and the Vietnam War. At best, the realist prediction is 
that “at some point Japan is likely to build a military machine that matches its economic 
might,”23 without specifying when exactly “at some point” is. To be fair, the new derivations of 
realism do provide plausible reasons why Japan has not developed military capabilities to the 
degree that neorealists would anticipate. They do so, however, by tweaking the realist theory to 
fit into Japan’s case, sometimes even to the extent of “violating (or modifying) the core 
assumptions of existing realist theory.”24 This stretching of theory to fit the empirical data, 
however, renders the universal applicability of the theory suspect, at least as it applies to 
                                                 
19
 Layne “Unipolar Illusion”; and Waltz “Emerging Structure.” 
20
 Layne “Unipolar Illusion”; and Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States 
after the Cold War," International Security 18 (1993): 34-77. 
21
 Michael J. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power. (New 
York: Palgrave, 2001). 
22
 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Re-Emergence. 
23
 Rajan Menon, "Japan: The Once and Future Superpower," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 53 (1997): 29, 
emphasis added. 
24
 Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2008): 37. 
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Japanese foreign policy. 
While Japanese minimalist military policy poses realists serious questions, Japan’s focus 
on economic development seem to be in line with liberalism, which emphasizes that free trade 
and economic interdependence promote economic cooperation rather than military conquest. 
However, liberals still have difficulty with explaining the origin of Japan’s aversion to militarism, 
an important factor that had developed before the causal, structural conditions stressed by 
liberalism had an opportunity to have much influence. Furthermore, liberals cannot adequately 
explain the depth of Japanese antimilitarism compared to that of other nations in similar 
structural conditions. While war is unpopular in the increasingly liberal, democratic world, no 
other states possess as intense a sense of antimilitarism as does Japan.
25
 Rationalists, be they 
realists or liberals, therefore do not seem to provide compelling accounts. 
Ideationalist scholars such as constructivists, by contrast, contend that understanding 
how actors formulate their identities is crucial to explaining their actions, as in Alexander 
Wendt’s words, “identities are the basis of interests.”26 Put differently, rather than treating states 
as unitary actors with a set of pre-existing interests and disregarding internal factors such as 
identities, ideationalists open the black-box of states and argue that both identities and interests 
are socially constructed.
27
 According to these theorists, differently constructed identities lead to 
different states’ interests, different understandings of the surrounding environment, and thus 
different behaviors. With this logic, interests are not pre-socially determined variables but 
                                                 
25
 Berger, “Norms,” 323. 
26
 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International 
Organization 46 (1992): 398. 
27
 The only exception is neoclassical realism, which incorporates both external and internal variables. While treating 
external factors such as relative material capabilities as the independent variable, it acknowledges the effects of 
these factors on foreign policy are mediated by the intervening variables, that is, internal dynamics such as 
decisions-makers’ perceptions about threats and their ability to mobilize resources behind policy initiatives. 
Although neoclassical realists open the black-box of states by accounting for the internal factors, they still do not 
question the formations of interests or identities. See Gideon Rose, “Neoclasssical Realism and Theories of Foreign 
Policy,” World Politics 51 (1998): 144-72. 
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depend upon socially constructed identities. States act differently even when facing similar 
material conditions as a result of their distinct identities and interests. The variations in states’ 
behavior, including Japan’s “anomalous” minimalist security policy (puzzle 1), are not a puzzle 
for constructivists. Moreover, while the materialist camp treats interests as a constant variable 
and the distribution of power as an independent variable, constructivists argue that “power only 
explains what it explains insofar as it is given meaning by interest.”28 Stripped of the discursive 
meaning rendered by socially constructed interest, material factors carry only the significance 
that actors give to them. 
This is not to deny the strategic instrumentality of mechanisms such as buck-passing 
and balancing set forth by materialists as rational means to advance states’ interests, or ends, 
under the given external conditions. When employing these concepts, however, we need to 
replace such objectively defined rationality and interests assumed by materialists with 
“subjective” ones that are socially constructed based on ideational factors.29 Put differently, 
states can still employ these strategies, or means, to advance what they perceive as interests, or 
ends, according to their own logic and internally rational calculations. In order to account for 
which strategies states would choose, therefore, one needs to consider the construction of state 
interests by analyzing state identities. My analysis employs a constructivist approach that enables 
explanations of state behavior in the materialist and ideational terms that actors within states 
employ to construct their state’s identities and interests.30 
                                                 
28
 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 109, 
emphasis added. 
29
 Schmidt, “Taking Ideas,” 7-8. 
30
 Using realist and liberalist concepts given the condition of identity may not be a novel idea. Yet, existing 
constructivist arguments about Japan’s security policy tend to underestimate or not even discuss realist and liberalist 
accounts. For instance, Kawasaki argues how the concept of security dilemma is unappreciated by the constructivist 
accounts by Berger and Katzenstein, which, Kawasaki claims, “seriously undermine their case.” Kawasaki, 
“Postclassical Realism,” 225-6. Being aware of such somewhat biased accounts by constructivists, I attempt to 
maintain a balanced stance between materialist and ideationalist, while I still base my analysis on the latter. 
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However, the extant constructivist accounts of Japan’s anti-militarist norms seem to 
contradict the recent transformations in Japan’s more assertive identity and security policy, 
failing to decipher the second “puzzle.” Critics attribute this inadequacy of constructivist 
explanations to two misleading assumptions about identity. First, Berger and Katzenstein 
overemphasize the stability of Japan’s pacifist identity to the point of making it appear “static.”31 
Thus, they assume the continuity of the nation’s security policy. Critics claim that this is why 
they have difficulty explaining the recent shift in the identity and security policy of Japan.
32
 
Second, constructivists treat identity “as a property concept, that is, as an intrinsic attribute of a 
state.”33 Instead, critics argue that identity is a dynamic, relational concept since identity is 
constructed by drawing social boundaries, or differentiating, between oneself and others.
34
 As 
the social context changes as states interact with one another, they engage in new forms of 
differentiation processes that produce new identities. Of course, identity is “relatively stable”35 
and needs to be so to serve as a plausible variable in analyzing states’ behavior. Yet, as other 
constructivists insist, “if constructivism is about anything, it is about change.”36 “[W]hat states 
do depends on what their identities and interests are, and identities and interests change.”37 
Therefore, identity is not a static but fluid entity. 
In order to treat identity as both relational and fluid, I employ a holistic constructivist 
approach that combines Berger and Katzenstein’s unit-level approach that focuses on the 
intrastate identity construction and a systemic approach that concentrates on the interstate 
                                                 
31
 Berger, “Norms,” 324. 
32
 Linus Hagström, “Identity Politics and Japan’s Foreign Policy,” Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 108 (2006): 184-5 
33
 Ibid., 184. 
34
 Iver B. Nuemann, “Self and Other in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 2 
(1996): 139-174. 
35
 Wendt, “Anarchy,” 397. 
36
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identity construction. In doing so, I pay particular attention to how the competing domestic views 
of Japan’s national identity contest one another in determining the national identity as whole. 
This enables me to explain how Japan constructs its identity through its interactions with other 
states at the international level and the complex dynamics of the internal contestations among 
competing identity groups at the domestic level. I illustrate that changes in the state’s relations to 
others can transform the dynamics of the domestic identity discourse, and vice versa, which leads 
to a shift in the state’s identity and thus in security policy. I will discuss this identity construction 
process in greater depth in the next section. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 In this section, I explain the theoretical framework employed in this thesis to analyze the 
identity construction and security policy of Japan. This framework proposes a holistic form of 
constructivism that treats identity as both relational and fluid. Before building such a framework, 
however, the definition of identity as used by IR scholars needs more clarification.  
 The concept of identity has been increasingly welcomed by IR scholars with the “rise of 
constructivism” after the end of the Cold War. However, as the proliferation of identity analysis 
has produced multiple conceptualizations and definitions of identity in the field, “the current 
state of the field amounts to definitional anarchy of identity.”38 This led critics to condemn the 
utility of identity, as it is “too analytically loose,”39 or it “means too much, too little, or 
nothing”40 to be a valid variable for the social sciences. This lack of consensus on the definition 
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of identity creates what Abdelal et al. calls “conceptual issues”—unanswered questions of how to 
compare different types of identities and use identity as a variable—and “coordination gaps”—a 
lack of consistency in the use of the concept.
41
 The definitional anarchy of identity also leads to 
an incomplete definition of the concept as a result of “the analytical blindness for [identity’s] 
multidimensionality and complexity.”42 
 In order to address these problems surrounding the concept of identity, I attempt to lay 
out a clear theoretical framework to treat it as a tangible and complex, multidimensional variable. 
I follow Abdelal et al.’s definition of collective identity as “a social category that varies along 
two dimensions—content and contestation.”43  I then enrich this analytical perspective by 
consulting Schulze’s concept of identity as a multi-dimensional character which comprises 
different “levels of identity”: levels that comprise the whole-identity and part-identity of 
nation-states.
44
 
 
Content of Identity: Constitutive Norms, Relational Comparisons, Social Purposes, and 
Cognitive Models 
 For Abdelal et al., content describes the meaning of collective identity and takes the four 
following forms: constitutive norms, relational comparisons, social purposes, and cognitive 
models. The first two forms—constitutive norms and relational comparisons—play a crucial role 
in constructing identity by enabling actors to perceive and define who they are. Constitutive 
norms are “constitutive rules” which define group memberships and therefore enable a group to 
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distinguish itself from others.
45
 They determine the roles of an identity by stipulating the 
appropriate behavior for a particular identity. Moreover, constitutive norms are “the very actions 
that lead others to recognize an actor as having a particular identity” as they “define the 
boundaries and distinctive practices of a group.” 46  Following such practices helps group 
members determine the social meaning of the group and enable group-recognition.  
The concept of relational comparisons tells us that the content of a collective identity is 
relational to an extent that it is a product of comparisons and references to other identities. An 
identity is “defined by what it is not, i.e., by some other identities.”47 As Michael Barnett 
explains, identity represents “the understanding of oneself in relationship to others… [and 
therefore] is fundamentally social and relational, defined by the actor’s interaction with and 
relationship to others.”48 Put differently as a “self/other lens,”49 a self constructs its identity by 
defining what is unique to itself and therefore different from the other. This distinction between 
self and other constructed through their interaction defines the idea or definition of self and thus 
the identity. As the international system comprises states and other groups as its dominant actors, 
a definition of the self in the IR sense is equivalent to a definition of a group, or a membership, 
stipulating who is a member of that group and who is not. Therefore, constitutive norms shape 
and construct state identity as a membership determinant in relation to other states.  
Moreover, the notion of relational comparison implies that the identity construction of 
self is influenced by the other. Identities “may be contingent, dependent on the actor’s interaction 
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with others”50 and thus can change as interactions and relationships of the self with the other 
develop into different forms. This perspective of identity formation is crucial in analyzing a 
state’s identity as a fluid entity because it is continuously produced and renewed as a result of the 
nation’s constantly evolving foreign relations with other actors in the international arena. 
The last two forms—social purposes and cognitive models—depend on the first two 
forms. The concept of social purposes “is analytically similar to the common sense notion that 
what groups want depends on who they think they are”51 and defines actors’ goals, interests, and 
preferences. By “lead[ing] actors to endow practices with group purposes and to interpret the 
world through lenses in part by those purposes,” this purposive content of identity establishes 
“obligations to engage in practices that make the group’s achievement of a set of goals more 
likely.”52 In the context of state actors, this implies that states form foreign policies in pursing 
their goals, or interests. Meanwhile, as actors see the world through their identities, they shape 
their understanding of the world, creating a cognitive model—“a worldview, or a framework that 
allows members of a group to make sense of social, political, and economic conditions.”53 
Therefore, states may act differently according to how they perceive their interests and such 
conditions based on their identities. This point corresponds to the aforementioned argument 
about why I analyze state identity before discussing the state’s security policy in terms of the 
material, strategic concepts of realism and liberalism. 
To summarize, the content of identity explains that norms define and construct an identity 
and assign social meanings and roles, which in turn form interests and cognitive perceptions of 
the world. This process happens through social interactions with others, and identity can change, 
                                                 
50
 Michael Barnett, “Israel’s Road to Oslo,” 9; quoted in Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 698. 
51
 Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 700. 
52
 Ibid., 698. 
53
 Ibid, 699, emphasis in original. 
  
19 
or remains fluid, as the interactions develop into different forms. 
 
Level of Identity: Whole-identity and Part-identity 
 Abdelal et al.’s concept of identity, however, does not address the multi-dimensional 
aspect of identity. As the meaning of relational comparison suggests, a self engages in 
interactions not only with one other but with multiple others. Therefore, state identity is 
“conceived not as a coherent structure but as a multiplicity of discourses, which emerge in 
relations with multiple other [states].”54 For instance, by analyzing the construction of European 
Union’s postmodern collectivity through its interaction with Central/Eastern Europe, Morocco, 
and Turkey, Bahar Rumelili demonstrates the formation of the self involves various modes of 
differentiation with multiple others.
55
 Within such manifold interactions with the others, “[a 
state’s] relationship with the same ‘other’ [state] can also involve multiple modes of 
differentiation that result in a complex identity construction” comprising “multiplicity of 
identities.”56 Against this backdrop, Alexander Bukh, examining Japan’s identity construction 
through self/other lens and locating the USSR/Russia as Japan’s “other,” argues that the political 
and socio-cultural identities led to different constructions of the Japanese “self” in the bilateral 
relation.
57
 What these statements suggest is that a state can sustain multiple different identities 
within itself in relation to other states. 
 Being cognizant of this multi-dimensional aspect of identity, Schluze employs the 
concepts of whole and parts by Harry D. Gould and those of levels of analysis by Nicholas Onuf 
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and contends that there are two different levels of national identity: whole-identity and 
part-identity.
58
 Within a national identity as a whole on the highest level, there exist smaller 
parts—part-identities—which interact with each other on the same level as well as upward and 
downward to form higher level identities. These part-identities are the multiple identities 
constructed via a state’s interaction with other states, e.g., pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist 
during the Cold War and internationalist and normalist during the post-Cold War period in 
Japanese case. 
 Moreover, as Schulze argues, the part-identities “on the same level…are not necessarily 
exactly the same” 59  but rather have their own contents: constitutive norms, relational 
comparisons, social purposes, and cognitive models. This is why each of Japan’s part-identities 
has a distinct vision of national identity and interest, e.g., Japan as a “peace nation” by pacifist 
and as a “merchant nation” by mercantilist. This is also why state (or any) identity “can never be 
reduced to a single element”60 but must be delineated as what I term a “mosaic” of multiple 
discourses, not a monolithic entity as assumed in most of IR theories.  
 
Contestation of Identity and Identity Construction 
 Here, I will attempt to integrate this levels framework into the last concept of identity: 
contestation. Contestation “refers to the degree of agreement within a group over the content of 
the shared identity,” and therefore “content [of identity] is the outcome of a process of social 
contestation within the group.”61 Thus, identity discourse is “the working out of the meaning of 
a particular collective identity through the contestation of its members.” And the contestation 
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never ceases as the individuals are continuously proposing and shaping the meaning of the group 
to which they belong. Thus, identity is always subject to such “endogenous change”62 remaining 
fluid as a result of the constant contestation process.  
We can utilize this notion of contestation as a descriptor of the degree to which there is 
consensus within a group called Japan over the content of the state’s identity as a whole, or 
whole-identity. Identity discourse is a process of determining the content of the whole-identity 
through the contestation of the members of Japan, specifically the part-identity groups that have 
their own distinct contents and whose members comprise the Japanese public, bureaucrats, and 
politicians.
63
 It follows that the established content of the whole-identity determines the state’s 
purposes, interests, understanding of the world, and therefore foreign policy. 
While this contestation occurs within states, the identity of a state is also formed through 
its constant interaction with other states. These two different avenues—intrastate and 
interstate—of identity construction are represented in what Christian Rues-Smit calls “unit-level” 
and “systemic” constructivism, respectively. 64  In concert with neorealists’ adoption of a 
“third-image” perspective, systemic constructivism focuses solely on interactions between 
unitary state actors. Ignoring what happens within the domestic political realm, it explains world 
politics simply by theorizing how states relate to one another in the external, international 
domain. Wendt provides a prime example of this form of constructivism. By drawing a 
distinction between the social identities (the status, role, or personality that international society 
ascribed to a state) and corporate identities (the internal human, material, ideological or cultural 
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factors that make a state what it is), Wendt brackets corporate sources of state identity and only 
focuses on how structural contexts, systemic processes, and strategic practices produce and 
reproduce different sorts of state identity.
65
 
Whereas the systemic approach treats identity as a relational entity by focusing on its 
construction at the interstate level, unit-level constructivism concentrates on the relationship 
between domestic social and legal norms and the identities and interests of states, drawing 
attention to the internal, domestic determinants of national policies. Berger’s and Katzenstein’s 
works on Japan’s antimilitarist norms use this form of constructivism. Their analyses, however, 
cannot adequately account for how Japan’s identity has shifted through its evolving relations 
with other states in the post-Cold War era precisely because they ignore the systemic level, which 
prevents them from handling identity as a relational concept. Moreover, despite their focus on 
the intrastate level, in their accounts “little attention has been devoted to the question of how 
contending views of security identity in Japan have structured specific security practices.”66 Due 
to this lack of the systemic perspective and attention to the “contestation” among the competing 
identity groups, the existing account cannot treat identity as a fluid entity and, thus, capture 
Japan’s recent identity shift. This is why Berger and Katzenstein cannot explain the recent 
changes in the state’s security policy (puzzle 2). 
Given these limits of the existing constructivist literature on Japan’s security policy, my 
approach takes a combination of both systemic and unit-level, or what Rues-Smit calls “holistic” 
constructivism, which bridges the two realms and “brings the corporate and the social into a 
unified analytical perspective that treats the domestic and the international as two faces on a 
                                                 
65
 Wendt, Social Theory. 
66
 Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan, 40. 
  
23 
single social and political order.”67 This is because both the domestic and international levels 
interact with one another in forming state identity. Though the identity is constructed through the 
internal contestation among identity groups, the dynamics of the contestation is always subject to 
changes in the state’s interactions with other states and position in the international system as the 
domestic actors are discussing the vision of the state that would be appropriate in this 
international context. If these external, or systemic, conditions transform (e.g., from the Cold 
War to the post-Cold War), the existing state identity may become no longer sustainable. A 
reverse could happen as well, if the domestic conditions alter (e.g., from economic growth to 
downturn) and compel domestic actors to reconsider the state’s relations to other states and 
standing in the international community. 
Facing such challenges to its identity both internationally and domestically, a nation will 
undergo what I call an “identity crisis,” an intense internal contestation process in its search for a 
new definition of state identity. The new round of contestation involves changes in the dynamics 
of the internal balance of power among the part-identities or identity groups caused by the rises 
and falls of the extant groups as well as the emergence of new ones, which leads to a shift in the 
state’s whole-identity and thus in security policy.68 As a result, identity is never static but fluid. 
Also, it is this contestation process that bridges systemic and unit-level constructivism and serves 
                                                 
67
 Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” 201. Examples of holistic constructivism are Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. 
Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: the Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International 
System,” International Organization. 48 (1994): 215-247; John Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing 
Modernity in International Relations,” International Organization. 47 (1993): 139-174. 
68
 This model of identity construction reflects Stephen Jay Gould’s evolutionary theory. In his account, evolution 
involves a two-step process. First, a variety of new forms emerges; second, some environmental pressure selects the 
fittest for survival. This mechanism creates what he calls “punctuated equilibrium”: One form will be dominant until 
environmental changes lead to the emergence of several new forms, one or two of which will become the new 
dominant ones. Inserting identities instead of forms, Gould’s theory could apply to the contestation process of a 
state’s identity construction. For details on Gould’s work, see Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary 
Theory (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002). Also, the application of Gould’s 
evolutionary theory can be found in Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of 
Systems Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). Spruyt examines how new institutional forms 
(city-league, city states, and kings) supplanted old forms (feudalism, the church, and empires) by the early 
fourteenth century and why territorial kingship became the dominant form among the other alternatives. 
  
24 
as a causal mechanism between the changes in the international security environment (exogenous 
shocks) and the identity shift (endogenous change). 
While I will address the theoretical implications of such a causal mechanism in greater 
depth in chapter four, it should be noted that contestation does not simply result in one victor 
part-identity solely determining the content of the whole-identity, as the literal meaning of the 
term may imply. Rather, the dynamic of the contestation process is much more complex; some 
part-identities are contradicting, complementing, corresponding, or even depending on one 
another. There can be compromises among the identity groups in reaching an agreement on the 
content of the state identity as a whole. Due to such complex relationships, the dominant, or 
hegemonic, identity group (e.g., mercantilist during the Cold War and normalist in the post-Cold 
War period) could incorporate other groups (e.g., pacifist during the Cold War and 
internationalist in the post-Cold War period) into its own discourse in a subordinate fashion and 
construct the whole-identity, which as a result encompasses multiple aspects of each identity 
group and remains a “mosaic” of multiple discourses. It is this heterogeneous nature of identity 
that complicates but also enriches our assertions about the concept. It also challenges a dominant 
(and perhaps misleading) assumption in all paradigms of IR that state actors are monolithic 
entities with a coherent set of interests. I will delve into this point more deeply in chapter four. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I reviewed the existing literature on Japan’s security policy and provided 
justification for my use of constructivist approach. I then illustrated the theoretical framework 
employed in the thesis, specifically content, level, and contestation of identity. Regarding my 
analysis of identity construction, there are three points to be emphasized: the construction 
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process (1) occurs both at the international and the domestic levels, (2) involves multiple identity 
groups, and (3) produces an identity as a mosaic of multiple discourses. A state forms its identity 
through its interactions with other states and its complex dynamics of the internal contestations 
of multiple identity groups. Both the international and domestic levels interact with each other in 
the sense that changes in the international system can transform the dynamics of the contestation, 
and vice versa. The established identity encompasses different discourses of multiple identity 
groups. Against this backdrop, the next chapter discusses Japan’s identity construction and 
security policy in the postwar era. 
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Japan’s Postwar Identity Construction and Security Policy 
The Cold War Era: The Rise of Pacifist and Mercantilist Identities 
 In this section, I describe Japan’s identity construction and security policy during the 
Cold War. I argue that the identity crisis took place through a contestation among three identity 
groups—pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist. The mercantilist camp emerged as the hegemonic 
identity and incorporated the principles of pacifism into its foreign policy agenda under the 
Yoshida Doctrine, defining the content of the state’s whole-identity as a “merchant nation” and a 
“pacifist nation.” As a result, Japan had come to eschew its military sword while concentrating 
on its economic development, and not to pursue military independence, and instead relying on 
the U.S. for its security. 
 
1945-1960: The First Identity Crisis and the Establishment of the Yoshida Doctrine 
 After defeat in the World War II in 1945, the Japanese state embarked on a challenging 
task of nation-building under American occupation (1945-52). This task included not only the 
reformation of economy, government, and constitution but also the reconstruction of state 
identity. Under U.S. influence, Japan underwent the first “identity crisis” in which there were 
three competing identity groups—pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist—who had different 
visions of state identity and interest.
69
 This internal contestation culminated in the 1960 mass 
demonstration over revision of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, in which the revisionists’ 
vision was utterly shuttered and the mercantilist Yoshida Doctrine emerged as the centerpiece of 
Japan’s postwar foreign policy and identity. 
 This contestation, however, did not take place independently from the external, or 
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systemic, pressures from other countries and the Cold War power game, in which Japan had no 
choice but to side with the West bloc and follow the world order defined and sought by the 
Western powers, namely the United States. This was especially the case for Japan, a country that 
was defeated in the world war and needed to appropriately position itself in the new international 
system to make peace with its former enemies. Therefore, Japan’s state identity was also shaped 
by its interaction with other states, especially the United States and its neighboring nations, and 
by its position in the Cold War bipolar order. 
 The new world order awaiting postwar Japan was a Liberal Democratic Order, in which 
the Western powers sought to disseminate free trade and democracy. The Bretton Woods 
institutions were established to ensure a new international system based on a belief that free trade 
would not only promote international prosperity but also international peace. The unprecedented 
growth of world trade following the aftermath of the devastating war under U.S. initiative 
presented Japan a path to economic power. Also inspired by liberal principles, the United States 
embarked on a universal project of promoting democracy to achieve international peace. This 
project included a liberal reformation of Japan as the top priority for the American occupation 
authorities, which demanded a series of democratization and demilitarization reforms. Among 
these reforms, the new Peace Constitution, mainly written by the Occupation force, was one of 
the significant outcomes as it contained Article 9 that reads: 
1. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use 
of force as a means of settling international disputes. 
 
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, 
as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of 
the state will not be recognized.
70
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These principles of Article 9 have been a cornerstone of Japan’s domestic pacifist discourse and 
identity, constraining options for security policy decision-making.
71
 
 In addition to authoring the constitution, U.S. liberal agendas played a role in selecting 
the new Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, whose opposition against the militarist establishment 
made him palatable for U.S. Occupation as a candidate for the next leader of postwar Japan.
72
 
He served as the head of the state, and concomitantly as foreign minister, for most of the first 
decade of the postwar period. This long-time service in office enabled him to shape the domestic 
security discourse, the conception of national purpose, and the new identity of postwar Japan. 
 The very first task facing the new leader was regaining the sovereignty of the defeated 
state. The San Francisco Treaty in 1951, which granted Japan peace with former enemies during 
the war and acceptance by the international community, marked a pivotal moment for the state to 
redefine its standing and identity in the postwar world. In addressing the treaty, Yoshida and his 
followers including Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Sato, who are known as mercantilists (and also as 
mainstream conservatives) envisioned Japan as a “merchant nation” (shonin kokka), a country 
that focuses on economic prosperity rather than pursuit of military power. Reflecting deeply on 
the lessons of defeat in the Second World War, they had come to believe that postwar Japan 
could best pursue its national interest by concentrating on building industrial strength so as to 
become a powerful trading nation. They were determined that postwar Japan would not seek 
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military independence as they believed that their country would be able to address internal 
security on its own but would have to depend on the United States for preventing direct invasion 
from outside. Therefore, stationing U.S. forces in Japan following the peace treaty was seen as “a 
matter of course.”73 Based on this new representation of postwar national identity, Yoshida 
concluded the peace treaty, and his followers later implemented mercantilist policies, setting the 
state on a path to economic power.
74
 
 Meanwhile, this new representation of postwar Japan was based on Yoshida’s masterful 
understanding of international relations at the time. He understood that in order to restore the 
nation’s reputation and gain acceptance by the international community, Japan needed to 
demonstrate to world opinion its commitment to a new, peaceful course. He foresaw that it was 
in Japan’s interests to draw itself close to the United States, the new hegemonic power and the 
promoter of the peaceful Liberal Democratic order. He was also confident that Japan’s aspiration 
to become an economic power with only minimal military power was made possible by the 
emerging Bretton Woods System and, more importantly, U.S. commitment to promote Japan’s 
economic development and to maintain its military presence in Japan and the region for fighting 
against the Communists. 
 Yoshida was correct. In the late 1940s, a few years before the San Francisco Treaty was 
signed, the U.S. government came to see Japan as a center part of its containment doctrine 
against the East bloc, as the triumph of the Communists in the Chinese Revolution in 1949 and 
the outbreak of the Korean War in the following year put Asia in the crosshairs of U.S. Cold War 
strategy. Fearing that Japan could be incorporated into the Soviet orbit in the wake of the 
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Communists’ surge in the region, George Kennan, or “the farther of containment,” recommended 
that the purpose of U.S. Occupation in Japan fundamentally shift from liberal reform to 
economic recovery.
75
 Concern that economic unrest could give momentum to the Communist 
and socialist movements in Japan prompted the Occupation Force to adopt Kennan’s proposal.76 
As part of the containment doctrine, there was also a broad consensus among American 
policymakers that their country would keep its military presence in Japan. 
 While these international conditions gave Yoshida a great bargaining leverage in the 
negotiation of the peace treaty, he faced two intractable problems. The first was Japan’s 
rearmament. In the wake of the emerging tensions between the East and West blocs in Asia, the 
United States demanded Japan’s remilitarization. However, Yoshida was already planning to 
resist such a demand, believing that rearmament was not desirable for either Japan or the region 
as a whole at that moment. Suffering from their agonizing experiences during the devastating 
war, the Japanese people were not likely to support such a move to remilitarization. Nor would 
Japan be able to bear the burden of rearmament with its fragile postwar economy. Many feared 
that economic unrest would potentially cause social mayhem, resulting in a less secure Japan. 
Furthermore, the public and many intellectuals at the time were concerned that rearmament 
would encourage the return of militarism, which had led their country to enter into the recent 
tragic war. This concern was shared among the other neighboring countries in Asia, many of 
which experienced invasion by imperial Japan during the war. 
 The second related problem was how Japan would accommodate U.S. force in its 
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territory following the peace treaty and enter into a collective-defense arrangement. In 
negotiating a security alliance treaty, the U.S. government insisted that it could not establish such 
an arrangement with Japan, since Japan did not have the means to defend itself nor could it help 
defend the United States. These roadblocks to creating a bilateral security arrangement, coupled 
with the intensification of the Cold War due to the outbreak of the Korean War at the time, 
created increasing pressure from the United States on Yoshida to accept Japan’s rearmament. 
 Moreover, it was not only the pressure from outside but also from inside Japan that 
Yoshida confronted. A competing identity group, the pacifists, opposed the signing of the peace 
treaty and its accompanying security treaty with the United States. This identity group, consisted 
of the Left, including the Communist and Socialist Parties, strongly opposed Japan’s rearmament 
and its involvement in the Cold War. In response to the experience of the devastating war and 
inspired by the new Peace Constitution, they envisioned Japan as a “peace nation” (heiwa kokka), 
a country dedicated to the pacifist ideals of its constitution, and advocated for forthright 
unarmament. The pacifists also called for Japan to take a neutral stance in the emerging Cold War, 
fearing that the security alliance treaty with the United States would align the state against the 
East bloc, invite Soviet hostility, and entrap the country in the Cold War conflicts between the 
two superpowers. For the pacifists, it was not appropriate for peaceful postwar Japan to rebuild 
its military and enter into the realpolitik of the Cold War power game. “Unarmed neutrality” 
(hibuso churitsu) was the correct path for the peace nation. 
 Despite these pressures from the inside and outside of Japan, Yoshida was able to 
skillfully deflect U.S. pressure for Japan’s rearmament and conclude the peace treaty and its 
accompanying security agreement by incorporating the pacifist discourse into his mercantilist 
foreign policy agenda. He thereby reconciled the coexistence of two different visions of national 
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identity—“peace nation” and “merchant nation”—despite their fundamental ideological 
difference. Domestically, Yoshida adopted the tone of pacifism in addressing the Diet: “It is my 
belief that the very absence of armaments is a guarantee of the security and happiness of our 
people, and will gain us the confidence of the world, and will enable us a peaceful nation to take 
pride before the world in our national polity.”77 In the negotiation with the U.S. government, 
Yoshida argued that Japan had a constitution that, inspired by U.S. liberal ideals and the lessons 
of defeat in the devastating war, renounced the possessions and use of arms, and that the 
Japanese people were determined to uphold such pacifist principles.
78
 Yoshida’s firm position 
throughout the negotiation led Douglas MacArthur, the head of U.S. Occupation, to accept that 
Japan should remain a nonmilitary state and instead contribute to the free world through its 
industrial production.
79
 As a result, Yoshida only made minimal concessions—U.S. bases on 
Japanese soil and a limited rearmament—which were sufficient to gain U.S. agreement to a 
peace treaty and to a postoccupation guarantee of Japanese security under the bilateral security 
arrangement. 
 While the signing of the peace treaty in 1951 marked a first step in determining Japan’s 
standing and identity in the postwar world, the road ahead was not smooth. First, Japan now had 
to rebuild its own forces. Upon Yoshida’s agreement to a limited rearmament in the treaty 
negotiation, U.S. government disclosed its specific demand in 1952 that Japan would develop a 
300,000-man ground force with ten divisions. Prioritizing economic recovery, however, he 
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reacted negatively to the proposal. Despite a month of intense negotiation, it was not possible for 
the two governments to reach an agreement on Japanese rearmament. 
 However, the following year saw a shift in the stance of U.S. government as both the 
domestic and international environments had changed. Domestically, a recession hit the Japanese 
economy due to a drop in procurements related to the Korean War and a tight fiscal policy 
implemented at the end of 1953. Internationally, the tension in the region was reduced with the 
end of wars in Korean in July 1953 and in Indonesia in July 1954. The conclusion of these 
conflicts set a clear geographic demarcation between the East and West blocs, turning the focus 
of the Cold War into a long-term development within each bloc. The U.S. government ultimately 
came to support Yohida’s position of focusing first on economic reconstruction over or before 
rearmament.
80
 
 Moreover, when establishing the Self-Defense Force (SDF) in 1954, Yoshida made a 
decisive move not to revise the Peace Constitution but to create the forces under the tenets of the 
constitution despite the tension between such armed forces and Article 9 that forbids Japan to 
have “war potential” (senryoku). In 1952, he ordered the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) to 
craft an interpretation of the article that would allow limited rearmament.
81
 In 1954, the CLB 
declared unconstitutional SDF participation in any collective self-defense arrangements. These 
ingenious interpretations not only preserved Article 9 but also allowed Yoshida to use the 
constitution as a means to limit Japan’s military buildup, and as a shield to protect against U.S. 
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demand for rearmament.  
 Meanwhile, in order to alleviate public anxiety about the return of militarism, Yoshida 
established a National Defense Council in conjunction with the creation of the SDF to provide 
parliamentary oversight of the armed forces—one of the important instruments of civilian control 
over Japan’s military. To further ensure civilian control over the SDF, Yoshida created civilian 
defense councilors (sanjikan) to oversee the Internal Bureau (naikyoku) within the Japan Defense 
Agency (JDA). In addition, the Upper House passed a resolution forbidding the overseas 
dispatch of the new armed forces based on the tenets of Article 9. These antimilitarist 
mechanisms served as hadome, or “brakes” in the evolution of Japanese defense policy, which 
ultimately worked in favor of Yoshida’s mercantilist agenda.82 
 While building such constrains on Japan’s military as part of his strategy, Yoshida faced 
another obstacle: an emergence of a third competing identity group, the revisionists (also called 
the “anti-mainstream conservatives”), led by Ichiro Hatoyama and, later, by Nobusuke Kishi 
after the signing of the peace treaty.
83
 These revisionists welded a muscular notion of national 
identity by holding to a traditional vision of Japan as a unique “national polity” (kokutai) marked 
primarily by its imperial statute and neo-Confucian values, which emphasize unity and sacrifice 
for the national order.
84
 In line with the realist understanding of the foreign policy, they declared 
that for Japan to become a genuine sovereign state, it must repeal Article 9 and rearm as well as 
maintain a reciprocal security commitment with the United States. 
 The increasing opposition from the revisionists, combined with consistent presence of 
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the pacifist opponents, severely weakened political support for Yoshida, which led to his 
resignation in 1954. As a result, in 1955, Japan saw a reconfiguration of its political party system, 
which would be later called the “1955 system” (taisei). In the new environment, the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) emerged as a coalition of the revisionist and mercantilist camps, based 
on a platform supporting the capitalist system and the alliance with the United States.
85
 The 
Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) championed the left pacifist position, while the more radical 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) slowly grew stronger on the fringes. 
 Under the new party system, two revisionists, Hatoyama and Kishi, occupied the prime 
minister’s office from 1955 to 1960. With their ideal vision of a muscular Japan, they attempted 
to revise the constitution, to carry out a forthright armament, to negotiate a more equal security 
treaty with the United States, and generally to pursue a more autonomous independent course. In 
seeking an independent diplomacy free of U.S. influence, Hatoyama sought to improve relations 
with communist nations so as to maximize Japan’s room for diplomatic maneuvering. In 1956, 
Hatoyama succeeded in signing a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. However, the revisionists 
faced great obstacles in implementing the rest of their agenda, especially the revision of the 
constitution, due to the pacifists’ opposition.86 This turned the revisionists’ attention to revising 
the U.S.-Japan security treaty, as they hoped to use the issue to trigger a greater military buildup 
and to pave the way for Japan’s participation in a regional collective-security system. Inevitably, 
it was believed, such an expanded military role would force the issue of constitutional revision 
back on the front burner of the political landscape. 
 The revisionists’ militant foreign policy agendas, however, not only mobilized the 
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pacifist opposition on the left, but also alarmed many mercantilists on the center. These fears 
were reinforced as the government prepared to revise the security treaty, with a legislative 
proposal to strengthen the powers of the police forces, which was seen by the public as a way to 
suppress anticipated anti-revision popular protests. The fact that the new Prime Minister Kishi 
was once involved in the policymaking during the world war aggravated the concerns that he 
might bring abandoned militarism into peaceful postwar Japan. 
 Consequently, Prime Minister Kishi’s announcing his intention to revise the security 
treaty in 1958 resulted in an unprecedented level of political contestation among the three 
competing identity groups—pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist. Protests spread across Japan 
over the next two years, reaching its climax the spring and summer in 1960 (1960 Ampo Toso). 
The Socialist and Communist Parties, along with prominent leftist reform intellectuals (kakushin 
interii), mobilized the popular protests against revision of the security treaty. With increasing 
violence and political tension,
87
 the Kishi administration came under growing criticism from the 
mainstream media, the business community, and even the mercantilist camp within the LDP. 
Eventually, Kishi was able to obtain ratification of a revised treaty, but only at the price of his 
resignation on June 23, 1960. 
 On the surface, the battle over the revision issue was a mere political struggle. On the 
deeper level, however, it marked a defining moment in determining Japan’s postwar identity, i.e., 
the conclusion of the first “identity crisis.” Kishi’s defeat and the consequent fall of the 
revisionist camp paved the way for the successive mercantilist administrations and consolidation 
of Japan’s national identity as a “peace nation” and a “merchant nation,” marked by a minimalist 
approach to defense and national security, and by the prioritization of economic prosperity over 
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rearmament. This grand strategy would later be referred as the Yoshida Doctrine, which was 
further implemented by his followers who repeatedly occupied the prime minister’s office for 
most of the Cold War period. This doctrine was defined by its three fundamental tenets: 
1. Japan’s economic rehabilitation must be the prime national goal. Political-economic 
rehabilitation with the United States was necessary for this purpose. 
 
2. Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international 
political-strategic issues. The Self-Defense Forces would not be deployed abroad. 
Japan would not participate in collective defense arrangements. Not only would this 
low military posture free the energies of its people for productive industrial 
development, it would prevent divisive domestic political struggles. 
 
3. To gain a long-term guarantee of its own security, Japan would provide bases for 
the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force.
88
 
 
The pragmatic policies of the Yoshida Doctrine indeed brought some criticisms of the identity 
account of the doctrine in later years. Some scholars argue that Yoshida did not use identity 
language such as “peace nation” and “merchant nation” in actual identity terms, as he and his 
followers “focused on national interest rather than national identity.”89 It is undeniable that 
Yoshida and his followers saw a political value in the rhetoric of a “peace nation” and Article 9 
for deflecting U.S. pressure against Japan to expand its security responsibilities during the Cold 
War, and for unifying the opposing domestic political parties. In fact, Yoshida admitted that “The 
day [for rearmament] will naturally come when our livelihood recovers. It may sound devious 
(zurui), but let the Americans handle [our security] until then. It is indeed our Heaven-bestowed 
good fortune that the Constitution bans arms. If the Americans complain, the Constitution gives 
us a perfect justification. Politicians who want to amend it are fools.”90 However, this argument 
does not necessarily deny the importance of the identity variable. Even though the intention was 
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more of a commercial rather than purely pacifist one, the Yoshida Doctrine based on pacifist and 
mercantilist principles, as discussed in the following sections, later served as a standard of what 
the nation should do, or even what it is (i.e. identity). In fact, contrary to Yoshida’s prediction, 
Japan did not “naturally” rearm even when it transformed itself into an economic power in the 
following decades. As Kenneth Pyle observes, the doctrine “took on a life of its own”91 and 
served as the central constitutive element of Japan’s postwar grand strategy and identity. 
 
The 1960s and 1970s: The Institutionalization of the Yoshida Doctrine 
 The nascent Yoshida Doctrine made at the beginning of the Cold War determined 
Japan’s foreign policy course for the next forty years. Over the next several decades, Yoshida’s 
successors significantly expanded his policies until they became a full-blown national strategy. 
Specifically, under the next two prime ministers, Hayato Ikeda (1960-64) and Eisaku Sato 
(1964-72), both students of the so-called Yoshida School, the doctrine was institutionalized and 
consolidated into a national consensus. 
 Meanwhile, the 1960 demonstrations that cost the revisionist political prominence 
taught these mercantilist leaders to avoid such divisive issues of military buildup and 
constitutional revision. They instead adopted a political strategy of a low posture toward the 
pacifists with a goal of establishing political stability and policies of managed economic growth. 
The mercantilist camp accommodated the revisionists on the right by maintaining a stable 
alliance with the United States, while appeasing the pacifists on the left by limiting rearmament 
and concentrating on economic growth policies that would improve living standards.
92
 Thus, 
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political compromise among the three competing identity groups that paved a path for the 
Yoshida Doctrine and a national consensus that Japan would be a “non-nuclear, lightly armed, 
economic superpower,”93 i.e., the state’s new identity as a “peace nation” and a “merchant 
nation” was consolidated. 
 In forging a path for an economic superpower Japan, Prime Minister Ikeda played a 
significant role, especially through his articulation of economic policies under his plan for 
doubling the national income within a decade. This plan capitalized on the emerging national 
consensus on the priority of economic growth. Due to the 1960 Ampo Toso, the revisionist chant 
for constitutional revision, rearmament, and independent foreign policy from U.S. influence had 
lost its political appeal for the Japanese public. They also rejected the pacifist demand for Japan’s 
“unarmed neutrality” wrapped in its pro-Soviet and pro-China socialist narrative, as the living 
standard improved under the new economic policies and the real picture of the oppressive regime 
in the Communist bloc increasingly became more widely known. Consequently, the Japanese 
public came to prefer the limited defense posture under the Peace Constitution. The national 
consensus was that “the general priority…[should be given to] first and foremost economic 
growth, with Japan neither adopting unarmed neutrality and socialism nor returning to the dark 
days of the prewar by adopting large-scale rearmament through a divisive constitutional revision 
process.”94  
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 Ikeda’s mercantilist agenda captured this emerging national sentiment, consequently 
co-opting the pacifist discourse of antimilitarism and ultimately settling Japan to a long period of 
enthusiastic pursuit of high-growth policies over rearmament. And in fact, Ikeda’s economic 
policies witnessed success that was more impressive than expected. While he targeted annual 
growth of 7.2 percent to achieve a doubling of national income in a decade, Japan saw a 
surprising annual growth rate of 10.9 percent during the 1960s. Ikeda not only captured the 
economic-centered sentiment among the Japanese public, but also was also able to transform the 
national consensus into actual economic growth, setting a clear path for Japan as an economic 
superpower and reinforcing the continuity of the Yoshida Doctrine.
95
 
 Building upon Ikeda’s success, another Yoshida protégé, Eisaku Sato, held the prime 
minister’s seat longer (1964-72) than any other individual in Japanese history and further 
institutionalized the Yoshida Doctrine. In 1967, Sato enunciated the “three nonnuclear principles” 
that Japan would never possess or manufacture nuclear weapons, or permit their introduction into 
its territory.
96
 In the same year, he formulated the policy of the “three principles of arms exports.” 
The principles held that Japan would not allow the export of arms to (1) countries in the 
Communist bloc, (2) countries subjected to arms embargoes under U.N. Security Council’s 
resolutions, and (3) countries involved or likely to be involved in armed conflict. Subsequently, 
the Miki administration (1974-76) tightened this ban on weapons exports to all countries and 
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defined “arms” to include not only military equipment but also the parts and fittings used in such 
equipment, practically prohibiting any sorts of arms-related export. 
 Meanwhile, limiting defense spending to less than 1 percent of GNP became the practice 
in the 1960s, although it was not official government policy until adoption of National Defense 
Program Outline in 1976.
97
 In conjunction with this financial constraint, the Japanese 
government further limited its military posture under “The Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy” 
(Senshu Boei), introduced in the first Defense White Paper of 1970, which stipulated that the 
country would only be allowed to use force in the event of an attack and to possess the minimum 
level of force necessary for self-defense. Furthermore, in 1969, the Diet passed a resolution 
limiting Japan’s activities in outer space to peaceful and nonmilitary purposes. 
 These antimilitarist policies implemented by Yoshida’s successors were also rendered 
possible in “[t]he international environment of the 1960s,” which, Kosaka Masataka, a leading 
international relations theorist, observed, “looked as though Heaven (ten) had created it for 
Japan’s economic growth.”98 Given its relatively small economy at the time, the state did not 
face an immediate need for an increased military role in international politics. The United States, 
with its predominant economic and military power, was able to continue its commitment to the 
international affairs and faced little need to rely on Japan’s economy or force for its security 
strategy. Japan’s economic growth was rather favorable for Washington as it reduced the need for 
U.S. economic aid to Japan and meant a stronger American ally in Asia. Also, the 1960 antitreaty 
protest proved the strength of popular resistance to greater defense efforts and the dangers of a 
socialist political surge. Therefore, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were content to 
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give priority to Japanese economic development, which they saw as a means to ensure Japan’s 
stability and democratic development and also as an investment to foster a robust supporter of 
Pax Americana in the long-term.
99
 
 The intensification of the protracted Vietnam War after the late 1960s, however, 
renewed U.S. interest and determination to increase Japan’s contribution to Asian security. This 
issue was raised again particularly during the Nixon administration in conjunction with the 
reversion of Okinawa in 1972 and more broadly the Nixon Doctrine. As the United States was 
determined to maintain its strategically important bases in Okinawa even after reversion, Sato 
faced the need to show that Japan was ready to assume a larger regional security role by more 
strongly supporting U.S. foreign policy in Eastern and Southeast Asia.
100
 Furthermore, while 
marking the era of détente (1969-1979) by improving U.S. relations with the Soviet and China, 
the Nixon Doctrine, announced in 1969, emphasized U.S. expectation for and dependence on its 
Asian allies to assume greater responsibility for containing communism in the region. 
 Meanwhile, as the pacifists argued against renewed calls for Japan’s expanding security 
role, the prolonging of the Vietnam conflict revitalized their agenda discourse in Japan. An 
anti-Vietnam War civil-society movement spread nationwide, incorporating the existing pacifist 
discourse and the anti-America sentiment among the political Left, especially among student 
activists.
101
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 Facing this dilemma between U.S. pressure for rearmament and the domestic pacifist 
antiwar movement, Prime Minister Sato made a minimal concession to U.S. demands. While 
South Korea dispatched more than 300,000 troops to fight alongside with the American 
counterparts in Vietnam, the Japanese government avoided any military involvement, satisfying 
the pacifist constituents at home. Instead of military contribution, Sato only committed himself 
to an increased economic assistance to regional security arrangements. Specifically, he assumed 
a leading role in creating the Asian Development Bank (1966) and significantly increased his 
country’s Official Development Aid (ODA) from approximately $100 million in the early 1960s 
to $244 million in 1965 and $458 million in 1970.
102
 While the United States and its other Asian 
allies were attempting to contain the Communist through military conflict, Japan took a different 
approach to the Cold War by providing economic assistance to stabilize the domestic order of the 
non-communist regimes in the region. Therefore, although the Vietnam War could have provided 
Japan with a turning point for its minimalist military posture, the state maintained the existing 
nonmilitaristic, economic-centered foreign policy. 
 In the 1970s, Japan faced a changing international security environment as the Cold War 
détente emerged with the conclusion of the Vietnam War and the diplomatic reconciliation 
between the United States and China. In response to this decline in the tension and the likeliness 
of armed conflict between the East and the West, Japan further consolidated its minimalist 
defense posture in the National Defense Program Outline in 1976. The outline served as the 
official basis of the country’s defense planning for the decades to come, stipulating the “Basic 
Defense Force Concept” (kibanteki boeiryoku koso).103 The Concept sets Japan’s defense goals 
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as to maintain the “minimum necessary basic defense force” to “repel limited and small-scale 
aggression, in principle, without external assistance” and, in case of larger assault (e.g., a 
full-scale Soviet invasion), to “continue an unyielding resistance by mobilizing all available 
forces until such time as cooperation from the United States is introduced, thus rebuffing such 
aggression.”104 The outline was clearly a continuation of the Yoshida strategy, which favored 
dependence on American military deterrence over the economically costly and politically 
destabilizing alternative of developing a more autonomous defense posture. The outline even 
adopted the aforementioned GNP1% cap on defense spending as a new restriction on the defense 
establishment. Japan again embraced the Yoshida Doctrine.
105
 
 The last adjustment to the Yoshida strategy was the adaptation of “comprehensive 
security policy” (sogo anzen hosho) under the Masayoshi Ohira administration (1978-1980). 
Underlying this new approach to security was the idea that economic security is as important as 
military security and that diplomacy should comprehensively accommodate military, economic, 
and other diplomatic resources. It was emphasized that security takes many forms and that policy 
instruments from different sectors of the government, in addition to more traditional military 
instruments, can be used to secure the nation.
106
 Therefore, when the détente collapsed after the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Japan, as an independent state, should maintain the minimum necessary basic defense forces lest it becomes a 
destabilizing factor in the region by creating a power vacuum.” 
104
 The outline is available at http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19761029.O1E.html. 
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 This reaffirmation and articulation of the Yoshida policies mustered wide support in the Diet. The outline’s 
moderate and minimalist tone precluded a potential surge of militarism and gained considerable support from the 
pacifists on the left such as the Democratic Socialist Party and the Buddhist Clean Government Party for its passage. 
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Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the United States demanded Japan greater military 
efforts for the intensified Cold War, Japan increased its oversea aid and diplomatic efforts instead 
of its military contribution. Specifically, Ohira promised to expedite the implementation of 
Fukuda’s plan to double Japan’s ODA in five years and expanded the target of Japan’s overseas 
aid to non-Asian countries.
107
 As a result, while Japan’s ODA was $458 million in 1970 and 
mainly targeted to Asian countries, it surpassed $3.3 billion in 1980 and its scope became 
increasingly global.
108
 With this positioning of such “strategic aid” as part of its “comprehensive 
security policy,” Japan was again able to maintain its antimilitary posture in light of the 
increasing international pressure for military buildup following the end of the détente. The 
Yoshida doctrine was preserved and further enshrined in the heart of Japan’s security policy. 
 
The 1980s: The Reemergence of Revisionist and Its Limited Successes 
  However, the mercantilist Yoshida strategy did not go unchallenged during the 1980s 
due to the surge of the revisionist camp under the Yasuhiro Nakasone administration (1982-87). 
This revisionist call for Japan’s greater defense posture, however, did not resonate with the 
majority of the Japanese people who had come to view economic rather than martial prowess as 
a constitutive feature of Japanese national identity. The new revisionist agenda realized limited 
successes, leaving the Yoshida strategy intact as the guiding principle of Japan’s security policy. 
 As a longtime outspoken nationalist, Nakasone had been highly critical of the Yoshida’s 
strategy.
109
 Despite his opposition to the mainstream Yoshida policy, Nakasone gained accidental 
                                                                                                                                                             
policies,” International Security 17 (Spring 1993): 84-118. 
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accession to the prime minister’s office in 1982, when the LDP’s party factions were deadlocked 
over a successor to Zenko Suzuki, who had abruptly resigned. Capitalizing on this opportunity, 
Nakasone attempted to supplant the Yoshida strategy by consolidating his own revisionist grand 
design for Japan’s foreign policy. The central tenet of Nakasone’s grand design was Japan’s 
active global role in international strategic affairs, which he articulated as an “international 
nation” (kokusai kokka). As the world’s second-largest economic power, Nakasone believed, 
Japan was no longer a follower nation in the Western world but a state that can and should play a 
leading role in international affairs, especially in military matters which the Yoshida Doctrine 
barred.  
 Against this backdrop, in his first meeting with the newly elected President Ronald 
Regan, Nakasone promised the reinforcement of the bilateral security arrangement and Japan’s 
more active role in the alliance. In fact, before leaving for Washington, he granted a cabinet 
approval of the transfer of purely military technology to the United States, which clearly marked 
a major modification of the three principles on arms exports set forth by the Sato administration. 
In Washington, Nakasone pledged Japan’s strategic commitment in the New Cold War, which 
emerged after the collapse of détente. For instance, he forcefully stated that Japan would “have 
complete and full control” of straits surrounding the Japanese land “so that there should be no 
passage of Soviet submarines and other naval activities in time of emergency.”110 Going further, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Nakasone initiated a bold opposition campaign against the prime minister’s policy by submitting a petition to 
General MacArthur asking for constitutional revision and an independent defense establishment. Nakasone remained 
critical of the Yoshida’s policy throughout the postwar decades, advocating for Japan’s independent defense posture 
and a genuine alliance with the United States with equally shared security responsibilities. During his term as 
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posture. 
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Nakasone stated that Japan should be “a big aircraft carrier” (okina koku bokan)—which was 
translated by his official translator as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier” (fuchin kubo)—to prevent 
penetration of the Soviet Backfire bombers into Japanese airspace. 
 Nakasone’s aggressive stance on security was also evident in the 1983 G8 Summit at 
Williamsburg, the first summit that took up Western defense and East-West arms control as 
issues for a joint statement. The main focus of the defense discussion was the removal of the 
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) SS-20 deployed in Europe by the Soviets. Despite the 
conflicting interests between the Soviets and the United States, the summit was able to produce a 
joint statement with strong language, thanks to Japan’s active advocacy of the U.S. initiative in 
the negotiations.
111
 Nakasone came to the summit determined to demonstrate Japan was, in his 
words, not “just an economic animal” and that the country was ready to speak out, to take stands, 
and to bear responsibilities on matters important to the security and prosperity of the global 
community. With this renewed active stance widely appreciated among the G8 nations, 
especially the United States, the Williamsburg summit presented Japan a stage to show its 
commitment to security issues from the global standpoint as an “international nation.” 
 Capitalizing on this international momentum, the Nakasone administration moved to 
remove the GNP 1% ceiling on defense spending. In December 1986, the cabinet decided on a 
                                                                                                                                                             
operations and further elaborated on this idea in the 1983 defense white paper, which used the term “sea-line defense” 
for the first time in a Japanese government official document. 
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 The statement included: “Our nations are united in efforts for arms reductions and will continue to carry out 
thorough and intensive consultations. The security of our countries is indivisible and must be approached on a global 
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administration was able to contribute to the tangible languages of the joint statement as well as the protection of 
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1987 defense expenditure that surpassed 1% of the projected GNP by 0.004 percent. In January 
of the following year, the Nakasone administration officially abolished the 1 percent cap on 
defense spending. While this move proved to be a matter of symbolism rather than actual policy 
transformation (defense spending actually went back to under 1 percent after he left office and 
has stayed so ever since then), it was a huge political win for the prime minister who came to 
office declaring that it was time to address hitherto taboo topics, including defense, and “settle all 
accounts on postwar political issues” (sengo seiji no sokessan). 
 Nakasone’s agenda also resonated with the political nationalism that emerged during the 
1980s. Many high-profile media figures such as Shimizu Ikutaro, Ishihara Shintaro, and Eto Jun 
led the resurgence of the nationalist discourse by appealing to national pride, and argued for the 
revisionist agenda that Japan should acquire military power commensurate with its new 
economic might and should exercise an independent foreign policy. They targeted criticism 
toward the postwar political system and the Yoshida Doctrine, which they deemed as responsible 
for the nation’s lack of independent policymaking. Many nationalists attacked that the “imposed” 
postwar constitutional system deprived Japan of sovereign rights fundamental to a nation-state 
including the rights of belligerency.
112
 Going further, the sociologist Ikutaro Shimizu advocated 
Japan develop an independent deterrent capability, including even a nuclear arsenal.
113
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 Most notable of such criticism, Eto argued that without the “right of belligerency,” which was renounced in 
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 Shimizu’s drastic call for militarization, however, became obsolete in the emerging 
nationalist discourse, which increasingly focused on economic over military power after the 
mid-80s. As tensions between the United States and Japan over trade and other economic issues 
grew (e.g. U.S. “Japan Bashing”) through the 1980s, famous right-wing nationalist 
commentators such as Jun Eto and Shintaro Ishihara increasingly concentrated on Japan’s 
economic and technological prowess while deemphasizing the military security matter.
114
 This 
emphasis on economy was accompanied by a surge of anti-Americanism among the political 
Right who began to vigorously attack the United States, using the bilateral trade friction to stir 
up nationalist passions among the public. 
 Behind this shift in emphasis was a new focus on the economy as a source of nationalist 
pride, or the consolidation of national identity as a “merchant nation.” Before 1945, Japan had 
proudly identified itself as a warrior nation, the land of the samurai, whose martial values 
distinguished it from the spiritually weak and corrupt West. In the 1980s, however, Japan came 
to embrace a self-image as “a nation of merchants and manufacturers, endowed with a unique 
propensity for producing high-quality goods that other people, including Americans, simply 
could not match.” 115  For the economy-first-minded constituents, it was the Yoshida 
strategy—not the nationalistic revisionist agenda of militarization and a greater military 
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role—that proved the best approach to their nation’s security.116 Amidst the Japanese economic 
bubble, a national consensus surrounding the Yoshida strategy was more potent than ever in the 
postwar era. 
 Prime Minister Nakasone attempted to transform this mercantilist tone of the national 
consensus by advocating a new Japan as an “international nation” that makes military 
contributions to the international community with its enormous economic resources. And he did 
succeed in articulating such a new vision of Japan’s role in world politics in an attempt to 
supplant the mercantilist Yoshida strategy. However, the actual accomplishments in changing the 
strategy were by no means transformative, since only slight modifications to the Yoshida 
Doctrine were adopted. While bringing a new realism to the defense debate, Nakasone 
committed Japan to assuming a larger security role and to greater cooperation with the Western 
allies, especially the United States. His government played an important role in the 1983 G8 
Summit to contain the threat of the Soviet INF. Nakasone modified, even if only in a limited way, 
parts of the Yoshida policy such as the three principles on arms experts and the GNP 1 percent 
ceiling on defense spending. When the United States demanded a military contribution to address 
the Iranian naval mines in the Persian Gulf during the First Gulf War (1980-88), however, 
Nakasone failed to dispatch the SDF for the minesweeping mission due to the constitutional 
constraints and opposition from the public
117
 and even his own cabinet and party. He was forced 
to stick to the nonmilitary approach of the Yoshida strategy such as economic assistance to that 
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ongoing conflict. 
 Accordingly, Nakasone’s grand design of a new foreign policy met with limited 
successes. Although the surrounding international environment had significantly altered since 
Yoshida’s day, his strategy had proved its worth and gained wide support among the Japanese 
politicians and constituents, who were enjoying the zenith of the nation’s economic growth. They 
did indeed incorporate part of Nakasone’s vision of Japan’s new international leadership, but 
only to the extent that “they envisioned nothing less than Japanese global leadership in economic 
and technological development, the pioneering of a new technocratic society—in short, world 
leadership in the nonmilitary aspects of the international system.”118 Put differently, consumed 
in the prevailing economic nationalism, his rearticulation of Japan’s role in the changing 
international environment was not able to consolidate a new national consensus but rather 
reinforced the existing mercantilist identity. It was not until the end of the Cold War that the 
country would come to seriously reconsider its national identity (the second “identity crisis”) 
facing the new security challenges such as terrorism, North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, 
and China’s military buildup, and embrace a more robust military posture as a “normal nation.” 
 
The Post-Cold War Era: The Rise of Normalist and Internationalist Identities 
 In this section, I discuss Japan’s identity construction and security policy during the 
post-Cold War era, in which the nation faced significant changes in both domestic and 
international environments that compelled reconsideration of the existing mercantilist, pacifist 
identity. In this second “identity crisis,” two new identity groups emerged: internationalist and 
normalist. While the former, retaining a similar vein of the Yoshida Doctrine, envisioned a 
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“global civilian power,” a peaceful economic power that makes nonmilitary international 
contribution to global order, the latter argued for Japan as a “normal nation” that possesses 
military capability commensurate to its economic strength while assuming increased security 
role in global politics.  
 As new post-Cold War security challenges intensified, the normalist has emerged as a 
new hegemonic identity, strengthening defense posture and initiating a more assertive security 
policy. Incorporating the internationalist principles into its foreign policy agenda, however, the 
new “normal” Japan has not become a great military power uninhibited with regard to the use of 
force for a pursuit of its interests or combat missions across the globe. Rather, it remains a 
“middle power” seeking to contribute to a regional and global security order that is struggling to 
meet the post-Cold War security challenges. Its contribution to international peace and security 
remains nonmilitary and humanitarian, eschewing any military ambitions of a great power status. 
As a result, the Yoshida strategy has not been displaced entirely but still resides at the heart of the 
emerging “normal” security policy, and is likely to remain so for some time to come. 
 
The 1990s: The Gulf War and the Second Identity Crisis 
 The nearly half-century-long Soviet-U.S. Cold War suddenly came to an end when the 
collapses of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union shocked the entire world. With the end of the 
Cold War, the world, including the Asia-Pacific region, witnessed a whole reconfiguration of the 
international system. This structural change in international politics erased from the Japanese 
policymakers’ minds the concerns that the country would be caught in the crossfire of a 
Soviet-U.S. military conflict. But it also presented Japan new anxieties and challenges. With the 
demise of its Cold War adversary, the United States, it was feared, would revert back to 
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isolationism it had embraced before the outbreak of the World War II and withdraw its forward 
military presence in the Asia-Pacific, leaving Japan exposed to deal with possible security 
challenges on its own. This would mean an extermination of the bedrock of Japan’s postwar 
Yoshida strategy—reliance on American security guarantee that enabled his mercantilist 
economic-first agenda and pacifist security policy during the Cold War. The new world order 
was beginning to raise serious questions about the relevance of the nation’s existing posture, or 
identity, as a “merchant nation” and a “peace nation.” 
 Arguably, the most significant post-Cold War external shock to Japan was the Gulf War 
(1990-1991), which revealed the inadequacy of the nation’s traditional mercantilist, pacifist 
standing in the new security environment. The war was a turning point in Japan’s foreign policy 
and identity. “This crisis was a major time of testing for Japan as a nation of peace and the most 
severe trial we have faced since the end of the war (WWII),”119 observed then Prime Minister 
Toshiaki Kaifu in the Foreign Ministry’s Bluebook of 1991. 
 In facing the first major international crisis in the post-Cold War world, the international 
community called on Japan to dispatch the Self-Defense Force to the Middle East as part of the 
multilateral, UN-sanctioned peacekeeping force initiated by the United States. This seemingly 
straightforward task proved to be intractable, however, due to the existing constitutional ban of 
SDF overseas dispatch under Article 9
120
 and the pacifist public’s opposition.121 Ichiro Ozawa 
and his allies within LDP (who later formed the normalist camp) attempted to pass a legislative 
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bill that would allow the overseas dispatch under the existing constitutional framework, but in 
vain. Following the failure of this bill, the Diet resorted to a hefty financial contribution of $13 
billion for the war effort against Iraq—which surpassed Japan’s ODA in 1991, approximately 
$11 billion and the largest ODA disbursement by a single country in the same year. 
 Consequently, Japan failed to make a meaningful “human resource” contribution, falling 
short even of Korea’s dispatch of 150 medics and the Philippines’ contribution of 190 doctors 
and nurses. Funded by $13 billion in aid from Japan,
122
 the U.S.-led coalition force implemented 
its operation in the Persian Gulf without the presence of a Japanese force. Despite its significant 
monetary contribution, Japan received little international gratitude or recognition. The Japanese 
government was not able to gain official acknowledgement for its financial support by the 
Kuwait government. Neither was it able to make its voice heard in the decision-making 
regarding the UN action, as Japan was excluded from the negotiation among the permanent 
members of the UN Security Council on how to respond to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis—a traumatic 
experience for Foreign Ministry officials.
123
 The Japanese government came under harsh 
criticism from the international community, which dismissed its $13 billion contribution as 
“checkbook diplomacy.” It was not until it sent the SDF for a minesweeping mission in the 
Persian Gulf—the first-ever overseas deployment of the SDF124—that the country finally gained 
international recognition. 
 This shaming experience was a wake-up call for Japan. The Gulf Crisis demonstrated 
the enormous gap between the nation’s economic might and its immature political prowess and 
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still-low level of real internationalization. The traditional low-posture foreign policy that had 
focused primarily on economic objectives and means, and that had worked so well in the past, 
was no longer sufficient. The Gulf Crisis also challenged the Japanese people’s perception about 
international politics. During the Cold War era, Japan maintained a pacifist cocoon, it was the 
single country in the world where its citizens seriously debated the legitimacy of possessing 
force and waging self-defense war—it was a unique, if not unrealistic, national stance satirized 
as “one-country pacifism.” This was rendered possible partly because of the large opposition 
Socialist Party and other left-wing parties such as the Communist Party, all of which 
continuously denied the legitimacy of the SDF and the right of self-defense. More important was 
the fact that, under the “1955 system,” the mercantilist LDP government avoided a confrontation 
with the pacifist opposition under “a tacit agreement with socialist and pacifist groups that 
divisive issues of constitutional revision and substantial military spending would be moderated 
and priority given to economic growth and social welfare.”125 
 In this political environment, the public and even politicians shunned away from 
nationwide discussions of their country’s security role and responsibility in maintaining the 
world order. All of that was blown in the Gulf Crisis, which revealed the inadequacy of Japan’s 
international contribution to the global security order. The crisis, one analyst observed, 
“crystallized and magnified the issues that Japan should have addressed long ago, but did not. To 
Japan, the Gulf Crisis was, in a way, ‘the day of reckoning.’”126 
 Amid this predicament, an emerging security instability in East Asia attacked the 
now-fragile standing of the pacifist nation. In 1993, the United States discovered a secret North 
Korea nuclear weapons program. Concerned about a possible use of the nuclear technology for 
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missile warheads, the United States and other Asian countries negotiated with the North Korean 
government to halt its nuclear experiment. But both sides were unable to come to an agreement, 
compelling the United States to consider bombing the North Korean nuclear facility and South 
Korea to evacuate residents in Seoul, and intensifying the likeliness of armed conflict in the 
Korean Peninsula to a level not seen since the Korean War. While this rising tension temporarily 
abated after the 1994 conclusion of the Six-Party Agreed Framework, the 1998 launch of the 
North Korean Taepodong missile over mainland Japan alerted the Japanese that their country 
could come under attack from its belligerent neighbor. Another uncertainty rose from China, 
which conducted a large-scale military exercise, even missile firings, in the Taiwan Strait in 1996. 
While the Chinese government stopped its provocative action when the Clinton administration 
dispatched two U.S. aircraft carrier groups to the strait, this incident reminded the Japanese 
citizens that the old balance-of-power game was not in fact a thing of the past. In short, all these 
developments, according to some experts, alarmed many Japanese that “national security could 
not be taken for granted.”127 
 Moreover, the mercantilist nation also faced challenges in the economic realm. The 
1997 East Asian financial crisis revealed the fragility of the regional economy Japan had 
attempted to promote for decades, and how vulnerable the Japanese economy had become in the 
globalization era. Also, the miraculous postwar Japanese economic growth that seemed to last 
forever suddenly collapsed after the financial bubble burst in 1991. A decade of economic 
stagnation following the financial meltdown certainly undermined Japan’s self-confidence in 
economic and commercial matters, questioning the one-dimensional economy-first policy that 
the nation had cultivated and embraced so dearly since 1945. 
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New Identity Groups: Internationalist and Normalist 
 It was soon recognized that what was needed for Japan was a formation of a new role in 
the radically changing environment of the post-Cold War order. The country faced a task of 
reconstructing its identity, or an “identity crisis.” In this second round of postwar identity 
construction, there emerged two competing views of national purpose and interest (i.e., identity 
groups): internationalist and normalist stances whose ideals originate from mercantilist and 
revisionist positions, respectively. Meanwhile, the pacifist camp retreated from the political 
forefront, and its antimilitarist ideals were carried forward by the internationalist group. 
 The internationalist, adhering to the tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine, argued that Japan 
should continue its role as a “global civilian power” (a term first coined by Yoichi Funabashi, an 
influential journalist and columnist): a peaceful economic state making (nonmilitary) 
contributions to international society.
128
 This new strategy, according to Funabashi, stems from 
Japan’s unorthodox power portfolio (“economic giant and military dwarf”), which gives the 
nation a golden opportunity to define its power and role in the radically changing post-Cold War 
world. In the new world of increasing interdependence, the salience of economic power triumphs 
that of military power, and Japan should search for various avenues of enhancing political power 
based on economic strength, not on military might, to contribute to international society. To this 
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end, Funabashi said, “Japan must pursue two psychologically conflicting mindsets and 
styles—active engagement in world peace and self-restraint as a military power…. Japan should 
push forward along the path of a global civilian power with its interests reaching well beyond its 
regional confines, while its military posture is limited to the self-defense of its islands.”129 As 
for promoting world peace, the nation’s security policy should derive its legitimacy from 
international institutions such as the United Nations rather than resorting to unilateral actions. 
The internationalists therefore approve of the SDF’s participation in UN PKO missions, but only 
nonmilitary ones. 
 Further developing this internationalist strategy, Yoshihide Soeya introduced the concept 
of “middle power diplomacy,” foreign policy that is motivated by its desire to play a greater and 
more active role in promoting international peace and security, or by what he calls “pacifism 
with an internationalist bent.”130 Japan, according to Soeya, should act like other middle powers 
such as Canada and Germany by remaining a trading nation which renounces traditional great 
power ambitions and contributes to international security under multinational auspices. It is 
therefore necessary for Japan to demonstrate its Asian neighbors that it has no great power 
aspirations by continuing promoting economic growth across the region rather than acting like a 
great power. Middle power internationalists, while maintaining the alliance with the United 
States, would regard important overlapping regional trade and security regimes to maintain 
friendly relations with other Asian countries. Japan, according to them, should remain a largely 
unmilitarized U.S. ally that makes international contributions by cooperating with other 
advanced industrial countries, provides economic assistance to developing countries, and helps 
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to maintain the international order. If the United States is the indispensible global police, Japan 
should position itself as the indispensible global merchant.
131
 The advocates of this middle, 
civilian power stance includes the members of the Kochikai—a LDP faction that had been a 
populated by the Yoshida’s followers—such as Hiromu Nonaka, Yohei Kono, Kiichi Miyazawa, 
and Koichi Kato. 
 Countering this internationalist view, the normalists call for an incremental armament 
for national defense and accept a military approach to maintain international peace and stability. 
On their account, Japan as a “normal nation” (futsu no kuni) should rearm itself to take more 
responsibility for its own self-defense, especially in the U.S.-Japan security alliance, and deploy 
the SDF overseas to assist Japan’s allies, particularly the United States, or to take part in UN-led 
security arrangements. The term “normal nation” was first coined by Ichiro Ozawa in the midst 
of the mounting international criticism toward Japan’s insufficient response to the Gulf War. 
Acknowledging the denouncement of Japan as a free-rider on international security and asking 
“how can Japan, which so depends on world peace and stability, seek to exclude a security role 
for its international contribution?,”132 Ozawa has forcefully argued that its political passivism is 
“abnormal,” and that Japan as a “normal” nation should assume greater international 
responsibilities, including military ones.
133
 Making Japan a normal nation is not necessarily 
about becoming a rearmed, militarist Japan, however, as Ozawa contends: “this is, quite simply, 
not an issue of militarization or aspirations to military superpower status. It is a question of 
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Japan’s responsible behavior in the international community.”134 And yet, this normal security 
policy still departs from the long-dominant Yoshida strategy that has deemphasized Japan’s 
military role. 
 Contending that Japan must shoulder more of the burden of maintaining international 
order through military cooperation with the United States or other like-minded developed 
countries, the normalists advocate more a proactive security policy and extensive SDF use. 
Specifically, they argue that Japan should enter into collective defense arrangements through the 
U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty or the United Nations. To this end, they recognize the need to 
revise Article 9 of the Peace Constitution that significantly limits the parameters of the SDF 
operations, including the right of collective self-defense. The recognition of collective 
self-defense, along with an adequate military buildup, would allow Japan to take a more active 
role in maintaining world peace, as well as a more reciprocal role to defend its own islands and 
its ally the United States under the bilateral security alliance. In revising the constitution, the 
normalists also advocate for establishing a formal “military” (guntai) instead of “self-defense 
force” (jieitai).135 
 This new military posture, the normalists argue, is especially important given the 
status-quo of East Asia, where significant security uncertainties loom around China’s rapid 
military expansion and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. In addition, defending Japan 
is not the only agenda for U.S. policymakers, and the United States has been experiencing a 
relative decline on the world stage and might not be able to protect Japan in times of need.
136
 As 
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for nuclear options, some right-leaning nationalists such as Shintaro Ishihara argue that Japan 
should not be longer dependent on the United States, and advocate for Japan’s autonomous 
defense coupled with nuclear capabilities.
137
 However, such drastic calls for remilitarization 
remain controversial among the normalists, the majority of whom are content with bilateral 
security cooperation. While still adhering to the Yoshida rhetoric of Japan as a peace-loving 
nation and accepting the U.S.-Japan alliance as the center pillar of security policy, the 
mainstream normalists believes that Japan as a normal nation should establish a stronger defense 
policy and do what it takes, including militarily, to maintain peace inside and outside its own 
islands. 
 The advocates of this worldview include Juichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, and Shigeru 
Ishiba, who came to form Japan’s “new conservative mainstream” to supplant the traditional 
mercantilist mainstream of the Yoshida School, and therefore subverting the middle power 
internationalists in the national security discourse. But this normalist overtake of domestic 
politics had to wait until the election of Koizumi as a prime minister in 2001, for the balance of 
power was still in favor of the internationalists during the 1990s, when the Japanese people were 
slowly adapting from the Yoshida consensus to the new reality. This political positioning 
between the two competing identity groups led the normalists to incorporate the internationalists’ 
soft-power foreign policy approach, and to renounce any great power ambitions of full-blown 
rearmament and global military reach. As one former senior diplomat suggests, “Any notion that 
Japan had of itself as a great power was pitiably smashed (mijime ni uchikudaku)” in the 
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1990s.
138
 As a result, Japan’s new security policy and identity seems to be somewhere in 
between, or a mosaic of, the internationalist and normalist approaches. Certainly, this new 
“normal” Japan is not a traditional “normal” great military power equipped with full-scale 
rearmament, including a nuclear arsenal, and willing to use its military prowess to pursue its 
national interests. 
 
International Contribution and Peacekeeping Operations 
 The originator of the normalist position, as already mentioned, was Ichiro Ozawa, who 
initiated a series of political experiments in the aftermath of the Gulf War. In light of the 
international criticism of “checkbook diplomacy,” Ozawa and his allies became more determined 
to increase Japan’s international profile. Japan, he argued, “must do thing normally, in the same 
way as everyone else.”139  Ozawa dismissed the government’s longstanding policy of the 
constitution bans on overseas deployment of the SDF as a “subterfuge” (gomakashi) of the 
Yoshida strategy, which he said has made Japan selfish and money-grubbing, not shouldering the 
cost of maintaining the international freedom and peace on which the Japanese economy 
depended.
140
 Impatient with the LDP’s inability to deal with the crisis in Japanese foreign policy, 
Ozawa and his allies challenged the party’s mainstream leadership and pushed for legislation that 
would allow SDF participation in collective security efforts by the United Nations such as UN 
PKO. 
 Following intense debate, the normalists finally succeeded in passing the UN 
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Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Bill (the PKO Law) on June 15, 1992, which ended the 
ban on the overseas deployment of the SDF, which had been a key aspect of the Yoshida strategy. 
In passing the bill, however, the normalist leaders had to converge their policy stance with that of 
the opposition parties and other LDP members who held internationalist views. When the initial 
submission of the PKO Law was struck down, the LDP government, led by the mainstream 
internationalist Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, made several concessions to the centrist Komei 
Party and the Socialist Democratic Party when submitting the new version. As a result, the new 
legislation limited SDF deployment to logistical and humanitarian support, monitoring elections, 
and providing aid in civil administration.
141
 In short, although the ban on overseas dispatching 
of the SDF was lifted for the first time—a huge step for becoming a “normal nation”—the 
deployment was restricted to nonmilitary missions, which made the new legislation palatable to 
the internationalists in the center. 
 After the passage of the PKO Law, the government dispatched the SDF for its first 
foreign mission, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), in September 
1992. The SDF sent 41 civilians (for election monitoring), 75 civilian officers, 8 SDF military 
observers, and 600 SDF construction personnel for road and bridge repair to Cambodia. The 
mission was responsible for the daunting nation-building project, and was a test case for the 
first-time-deployed Japanese peacekeepers, and for the Japanese, who showed fragile support for 
that deployment. In fact, when a Japanese volunteer, not part of the official mission, and a 
Japanese policeman were killed in the spring of 1993, the Japanese media went into a “feeding 
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frenzy,” reflecting the public’s shock at this first loss of Japanese life on foreign soil.142 Despite 
the increasing popular calls for withdrawing the SDF from Cambodia, the government made a 
bold decision to continue the mission, arguing that the incident did not mean a collapse of the 
peace agreement. This judgment later proved correct, when elections in Cambodia were held 
smoothly with an almost 90 percent voter turnout, granting legitimacy and local support for the 
reconstruction process. 
 This successful completion of the Cambodian operation in September 1993 marked an 
important point in the slow evolution of Japan’s international role and its public’s opinion. When 
the Diet debated the PKO Law in the spring of 1992, public opinion was divided in half. Public 
support for the Cambodian operation was fragile as the peace agreement process met many 
difficulties, including the loss of Japanese life along the way. When the UNTAC turned out to be 
successful, however, the majority of the Japanese came to support the SDF participation in the 
operation with an increasingly positive attitude toward the multilateral framework. Surprisingly, 
59 percent of the public supported the participation and 36 percent opposed it; 68 percent viewed 
UN PKO “useful” for maintaining peace and 28 percent disagreed with such a view.143 In 
addition, constitutional revision for increasing international contribution such as UN PKO gained 
majority support increasing from 23 percent in 1986 to 33 percent in 1991 to 50 percent in 
March 1993, while opposition declined from 57 percent to 51 percent to 33 percent.
144
 The 
disappearance of the long-dominant taboo of discussing constitutional revision indicated a 
departure from the old political landscape.  
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 And yet, public opinion remained cautious when the PKO missions would involve 
military operations. During the Cambodian mission, 66 percent of the Japanese worried about the 
government expanding the role of the SDF beyond humanitarian and reconstruction missions. 
Another polls conducted in 1991 and 1993 suggested that the large majorities (63 percent and 74 
percent, respectively) of the public did not believe that Japan had a responsibility “to give 
military assistance in trouble spots around the world when it is asked by allies.”145 A 1994 
public poll showed that 70.5 percent expressed their support for SDF participation in 
peacekeeping, but that 71.6 percent opposed expanding participation into peacekeeping 
operations involving the use of force.
146
 Clearly, the Japanese people were not prepared to see 
their troops engaging in armed conflict but only in humanitarian operations. Meanwhile, the 
Prime Minister’s Office poll demonstrated an increase in support for SDF participation in 
disaster relief operation overseas. The number went up from 54.2 percent in 1991 to 61.6 percent 
in 1994 and 78.0 percent in 1997 and 86.3 in 2000.
147
 These data demonstrate that the Japanese 
people increasingly recognized a distinction between overseas deployments for nonmilitary 
activities (kaigai haken) (such as humanitarian and reconstruction missions) and deployments for 
the sake of using military force (kaigai hahei). Obviously, the public was supportive of the 
former but not of the latter. They viewed nonmilitary, civilian approaches to resolving conflict 
more effective. 
 Under the slogan of “international contribution” (kokusai koken), the Japanese people 
began to accept Japan’s new international role, or its “normal” posture in the changing security 
environment of the post-Cold War world. Following the Cambodian operation, the government 
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expanded the SDF PKO missions, sending SDF personnel to Mozambique (1993-1995), Rwanda 
(1994), Golan Heights (1996), and East Timor (2002-2005) for UN peacekeeping and other 
humanitarian activities. This new security role, however, remained nonmilitary and was mainly 
motivated by humanitarian reasons of promoting world peace rather than aspirations to become a 
great military power. 
 
The Falls of Normalists and Pacifists 
 Despite the success in expanding the SDF security role, after passing the PKO Law the 
normalist agenda of boosting up Japan’s military establishment was stymied. For Japan to truly 
become a “normal nation,” Ozawa and his allies were determined to end the “1955 system” that 
had allowed mainstream mercantilist control of foreign policy and maintained the Yoshida 
Doctrine. And they did so by initiating the June 1993 groundbreaking upheaval in the political 
system including creating a seven-party “rainbow” coalition government without the LDP. 
However, the normalists’ days did not last long, with their political support soon collapsing due 
to the fragile coalition among opposition parties. In June 1994, the government again fell into the 
hands of the LDP, but this time under the LDP-JSP (Japan Socialist Party) coalition headed by 
the JSP leader Tomiichi Murayama—a steadfast pacifist who had viciously opposed Ozawa’s 
normalist policies including the PKO Law—as a new prime minister. Ozawa’s normalist agenda 
was put to an end. 
 The election of the Socialist leader as the new prime minister precipitated an 
unanticipated outcome—a collapse of the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party, under Murakami, 
came into office for the first time in forty-seven years since the 1947 Katayama administration, 
but it entailed a huge cost. In building a coalition with the LDP, the leader of the pacifist party 
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had to abandon all the important ideological positions his party had vociferously maintained 
since its establishment. For almost a half century, the Socialists had opposed the Self-Defense 
Force as unconstitutional, denied the legitimacy of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, and 
supported unarmed neutrality. They had boycotted the vote on the PKO Law, which allowed the 
overseas dispatching of the SDF. Murayama abruptly reversed the party’s policies on all these 
issues. His abandonment of these party stances marked the end of the opposing axis in security 
matters that distinguished pacifists from the opposing views of mercantilists and revisionists. 
 Moreover, in the June 1995, a Socialist-drafted Diet antiwar resolution (fusen ketsugi) 
expressing “deep remorse” for Japan’s past military aggression and “renewing the determination 
for peace”148 was largely rewritten by the LDP and voted on in the Diet. While this sort of 
resolution usually gains the Diet’s approval with unanimous votes, more representatives (241) 
abstained than supported it (230). Clearly, “pacifism’s day was passing.” 149  At the end, 
Murayama resigned shortly after the 1996 general election, in which the Socialist Party suffered 
its worst defeat in the postwar era. The party was penalized by former supports who resented the 
party’s renouncement of its longstanding pacifist values. The most viable opposition party during 
the Cold War—once holding 136 seats (out of 512) in the Diet—was left with only single-digit 
representation by the early 2000s. 
 This marginalization of the Socialist Party, however, was not only a result of its own 
suicidal move to abandon the pacifist ideals. These ideals were becoming increasingly 
anachronistic in the changing post-Cold War security environment. The central tenet of the 
party’s pacifist stance—“unarmed neutrality”—lost its relevance once the Cold War conflict 
ended. Given the disappearance of the blocs in relation to which Japan should maintain neutrality, 
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only unarmament and the anti-base movement were left on the pacifists’ agendas. But 
unarmament proved to be an unattractive, if not an unrealistic, position when North Korea 
suddenly withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and began to run its course to 
become a nuclear state. This increased regional security uncertainty contributed to the “awaking” 
of the Japanese public to national security issues.
150
 In the wake of the following 1996 Taiwan 
Strait Crisis and the 1998 North Korean missile launch, the Japanese people began to openly 
discuss military threats. Moreover, the social status of the SDF—which the Socialists deemed 
unconstitutional during the Cold War—had been steadily improving and gaining strong popular 
support.
151
 Pacifism, at least in a strict sense of keeping Japan unarmed, no longer resonated 
with the public. 
 
Pacifism in a New Form 
 These political losses of the Socialist Party’s presence and its pacifist stances, however, 
did not necessarily mean that the principles of pacifism had vanished from the public debate. 
Rather, post-Cold War pacifism took a new form. Postwar pacifism was a forthright rejection of 
any military activities, emerging from deep remorse about the nation’s past military aggressions. 
The pacifism of this period did not distinguish wars of aggression, wars of self-defense, and wars 
for the sake of international security. It was widely assumed that any mode of military activity 
would lead to a revival of militarism. And yet, the Gulf War demonstrated the lack of Japan’s 
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contribution to international security, and the successful UNTAC operation the fruitfulness of 
such contributions. The Japanese people came to recognize their nation’s international security 
cooperation and to distinguish between the three categories of war, while at the same time 
supporting pacifism and the philosophy of international accord. This emerging pacifism, however, 
was different from the existing one in that while condemning wars of aggression and mindless 
nationalism, factors that had led to Japan’s defeat in the WWII, the Japanese began to appreciate 
security activities grounded in a healthy spirit of international accord.
152
 
 Both normalists and internationalists then adopted these new pacifist ideals, promoting 
the notion of Japan’s “international contribution” to maintaining world peace, while they 
disagreed over whether the contribution should be made militarily. The government came to 
allow SDF foreign deployments after the passage of the PKO Law, but the operation avoided any 
armed missions and remained mainly humanitarian. Pacifism may have not survived in its strict 
terms of forthright rejection of any military activities but still continued to influence policy 
decisions in terms of the emerging internationalism. In fact, the 1995 National Defense Program 
Outline—in which the Japanese government, for the first time in twenty years, comprehensively 
reviewed its security posture—emphasized Japan’s contribution to international society. Given 
the passage of the PKO Law few years earlier, the new NDPO added two new missions to the 
SDF’s portfolio: disaster relief and international peacekeeping. 
 Moreover, this soft-power approach, which was further developed under the Keizo 
Obuchi’s administration (1998-2000), adopted “human security” as a pillar of Japanese security 
policy. In response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Japanese government, along with South 
Korea and China, took the initiative in establishing ASEAN+3 to promote regional economic 
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cooperation. At the ASEAN+3 summit in December 1998, Obuchi expressed his concerns 
regarding the crisis’ impacts on human security in the region such as the well-being and 
development of the socially vulnerable segments of the population. Acting on such ideas, he 
announced a total $4.2 million ODA package to establish a “Human Security Fund” under the 
United Nations—later renamed the Trust Fund for Human Security—to assist neighboring Asian 
countries in need, and to promote human security projects by UN agencies around the world. 
 
Preparing for a “Normal” Security Policy 
 While these moves represented a soft-power, internationalist approach in line with Japan 
as a “global civilian power,” there was also a slow evolution toward normalization. While it 
maintained the Basic Defense Force Concept, the new NGPO identified emerging security 
uncertainties in Asia and upgraded the U.S.-Japan security alliance in the event of a regional 
crisis, calling for establishing “multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces” to meet 
these security challenges. In the post-Cold War world, the bilateral security alliance, which first 
began as part of U.S. strategy to contain the Soviet Union, now found its new values in 
addressing regional security challenges. The 1996 U.S. Joint Declaration on Security reaffirmed 
these new values, reemphasizing the importance of the bilateral security cooperation in the 
post-Cold War and stipulating that such cooperation is not limited to Japan’s national defense and 
bilateral framework but includes regional and global security. The declaration also recommended 
revision of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, which took place in the 
following year. The new guidelines identified specific terms of possible security cooperation 
regarding “situations in areas surrounding Japan” (shuhen jitai) and declared that Japan would 
now take fuller responsibility for defense of such areas, a move that one analyst has called “a 
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significant upgrade of operability in responding to regional contingencies.”153 
 These new security commitments marked a bold step toward upgrading, or 
“normalizing,” Japan’s security posture in the changing post-Cold War security environment. 
Whether such commitments were to be put into tangible action, however, remained to be seen in 
the 1990s. The real test came as the world welcomed the twenty-first century, in which Japan 
encountered a series of security challenges—terrorism, intensifying North Korean nuclear and 
missile tests, and China’s rapid military buildup and renewed assertiveness in the region—that 
posed serious policy questions to the normalist leaders. 
 
The 2000s: The Era of Normalism 
 As Japan entered the twenty-first century, it welcomed in Juichiro Koizumi as its new 
prime minister (2001-06). Koizumi was certainly a new type of leader in Japanese politics. He 
had been calling for groundbreaking political reforms, and appealing for public dissatisfaction 
with the government’s inability to reform the country during the so-called “lost decade” of 
economic stagnation and political disarray. Attacking party faction politics and the cozy 
relationships between party institutions and bureaucracies as the “cancer” of incompetent 
postwar Japanese politics, he pledged to “destroy the LDP” (jiminto wo bukkowasu) and start a 
new kind of politics. As a result, Koizumi came into office with overwhelming popular support. 
Keeping his promise, he and his allies effectively weakened the influence of factions in his party, 
including the now-splintered Kochikai, which had been a clusterof Yoshida’s followers (i.e. the 
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Cold-War mercantilists and the post-Cold War internationalists).
154
 Instead of forging political 
support based on factions and interest groups, he initiated a new type of populist politics that 
appealed to public support via political performances through which he was able to implement 
new policies. In his five years of prime ministership—the longest term since the Sato 
administration (1964-72)—Koizumi and his allies initiated a series of new normalist policies 
amidst sweeping popular support, which previously went unimplemented due to the 
internationalist opposition from his own party and other opposition parties during the 1990s. 
 A political stage for the new normalist policies was in fact already in place with the 
election of the George W. Bush administration in the United States. Criticizing the Clinton 
administration’s accommodative approach to China and North Korea, President Bush made it 
clear that the U.S.-Japanese alliance was the central pillar of U.S. foreign policy in Asia. Acting 
on this idea, he appointed Richard L. Armitage, a pro-Japan veteran and politician who was one 
of the masterminds of that new foreign policy strategy, as the Deputy Secretary of State.
155
 U.S. 
policymakers at the time were determined to encourage Japan to increase its international role 
while respecting its autonomy, and with the ultimate goal of bilateral relations to the level of 
U.S.-U.K. relation.
156
 Prime Minister Koizumi was quick to respond to Bush’s love call by 
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visiting the United States and establishing a close personal relationship with the new President. 
 
Supporting the War on Terror 
 Japan’s strengthening bilateral relationship first came under scrutiny when on 
September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists mounted the first attack on the U.S. soil since 
Pearl Harbor. Pledging to fight the terrorist threats, President Bush declared the beginning of the 
“war on terror” a few days before U.S. Congress officially did so on September 20. In response 
to these developments, Prime Minister Koizumi visited the United States two weeks after the 
tragedy in order to express Japan’s steadfast support for the new war effort. This 
uncharacteristically responsive move was largely the result of the lessons learned during the Gulf 
War, during which Japan was unable to swiftly or substantively contribute to the U.S.-led war 
effort and was consequently snubbed by the international community. After 9/11, Japan was 
determined not to make the same mistake again. 
 In October 2011 when the United States initiated Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan, the Koizumi administration swiftly passed a special anti-terrorism legislation and 
moved to provide tactical support for the US war effort. By providing offshore, rear-area, 
noncombat logistical support for the US-sanctioned coalition and deploying Aegis-equipped 
destroyers and tankers to shuttle fuel to coalition navies in the Indian Ocean, Koizumi sought to 
demonstrate that the SDF was prepared to play a larger-than-ever role in a war effort—a 
revolutionary development for postwar pacifist Japan. 
 The war in Afghanistan was only a beginning of the emerging war on terrorism. After 
President Bush delivered his famous 2002 State of Union Address condemning Iraq, Iran, and 
North Korea as the “axis of evil,” the so-called “second stage” of the U.S. global war against 
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terrorism commenced. Under its new anti-terrorism strategy, the United States began to wage a 
war against Iraq on March 20, 2003 under the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing,” without 
explicit U.N. approval. Despite fierce domestic opposition and concerns about invasion’s 
legitimacy, especially from the internationalists who emphasized the necessity of a U.N. 
resolution to justify the war effort, Prime Minister Koizumi immediately expressed his support 
for the controversial military intervention. In response, the Japanese government approved the 
deployment of a small contingent group of SDF ground troops for humanitarian and 
infrastructure missions. The mission itself was limited to “noncombat” zones—which were 
controversially defined by Koizumi as “the area where the SDF is operating.”157 Regardless of 
whether the area was actually a noncombat zone, this operation marked the first deployment of 
the SDF into an active conflict. This deployment marked a turning point in Japan’s postwar 
security policy. After nearly a half century of de facto nonparticipation in maintaining 
international security, the country found itself supporting, and dispatching its forces in, the global 
war on terrorism. 
 
Coping with the Security Challenges in East Asia 
 The emerging terrorist threat was not the only security concern for the Japanese 
policymakers. Instability in East Asia intensified as North Korea periodically continued its 
nuclear and missile tests for more than a decade. Of equal or possibly more importance was the 
rise of China as an economic and military power. Such concerns were well reflected in the new 
2004 National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG, previously called NDPO). While calling the 
North Korean nuclear and missile programs “a major destabilizing factor to regional and 
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international security,” the NDPG was the first national document that openly identified a 
potential threat from China, noting that the country was seeking to “modernize its nuclear forces 
and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces” while “expanding its area of operation 
at sea.”158 The Japanese public was also increasingly alarmed. A China-Japan joint public 
polling conducted in 2006 showed that 72.4 percent of Japanese respondents identified North 
Korea as a military threat while 42.8 percent also identified China as such.
159
 
 The NDPG also identified “new threats and diverse situations,” including ballistic 
missile attacks (by North Korea and China), attacks by guerrillas and special forces, aggression 
against oceanic islands, intrusion into territorial air and maritime space (i.e. Chinese intrusion 
into Japanese territorial waters and airspace near the Senkaku Islands), and large-scale disasters. 
In addressing these various security challenges, the NDPG, in line with the previous NDPO, 
declared that Japan needed to develop “multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces 
that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art 
technologies and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the military-technological level of 
other major countries.” Against this backdrop, the NDPG set the agenda for the augmentation of 
Japan’s defensive and potentially offensive power-projection capabilities.160 
 Alongside these military procurements, the most significant and controversial 
development in the early 2000s was arguably the introduction of Japan’s ballistic missile defense 
(BMD) system. The BMD project first started as a joint research project between the United 
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States and Japan in the wake of the 1998 North Korea missile test. The 2003 government 
officially announced deployment of the BMD system, including Aegis-type destroyers with the 
Standard Missile System (SM-3) and ground-to-air Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) 
lower-tier. The North Korean missile threat was the prime justification for the deployment, 
although the BMD could also be mobilized to counter increasing Chinese ballistic missile 
capabilities, which the 2004 NDPG noted. Furthermore, when issuing the 2004 NDGP, the 
Koizumi cabinet also decided to proceed with the co-development of BMD with the United 
States in December 2004—clearly violating the self-imposed ban on the export of arms.161 The 
BMD deployment raised questions about its use for collective self-defense, as it could be used to 
intercept missiles targeted toward third parties, specifically the United States.
162
 
 In addressing North Korea’s missile threat, the Japanese government also responded by 
expanding its use of outer space. In response to the 1998 North Korean missile launch, the 
government announced its plan to deploy surveillance satellites, although such moves would 
possibly contradict the 1969 principle of the nation’s “peaceful use of space.” Between 2003 and 
2007—occasioned by the 2006 North Korean missile launch—Japan launched four nationally 
produced intelligence-gathering satellites in order to monitor North Korea’s missile bases. 
Furthermore, in March 2006, the LDP shifted from the 1969 interpretation of “peaceful” (heiwa 
no mokuteki) as meaning “nonmilitary” (higunji), announcing its intention to allow the use of 
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space for what it called “nonoffensive defensive purposes.” In June 2007, the party introduced a 
new Basic Law for Space Activities, which states that Japan will conduct activities in space in 
compliance with the principles of the constitution, thereby permitting the use of space for 
“defensive” purposes.163 
 Despite the controversial nature of BMD and its use of space for military purposes, 
these moves toward militarization gained widespread support among Japanese lawmakers and 
the public. The decisions on the joint development and deployment of strategically important 
BMD overcame differences among the relevant ministries and gained strong support from both 
LDP and DPJ members.
164
 The deployment of the BMD system also appeared to enjoy 
considerable support from the public. A 2006 national poll found that 56.6 percent (25 percent 
strongly, 31.6 somewhat) support missile defense, versus only 25.1 percent (8.9 percent strongly, 
16.2 percent somewhat) opposing it. The government’s decision to speed up the process of 
deploying BMD system following the 2006 North Korean missile and nuclear tests gained 
support from the LDP-led ruling coalition as well as the opposition DPJ. When LDP Prime 
Minister Taro Aso (2008-09) announced the deployment of the BMD system in April 2009 to 
intercept North Korean missiles, an overwhelming 74.7 percent of the public supported the 
decision, while only 16 percent opposed it.
165
 The new legislation regarding the use of space 
also gained widespread support from the Diet, including the Komeito Party and the opposition 
DPJ. Clearly, Japanese politicians and public were increasingly alarmed about the North Korean 
security threat. As a result, despite the controversial nature of the BMD and military use of space, 
the Japanese appeared to be increasingly tolerant of their nation’s new “normal” security posture. 
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 In tandem with Japan’s domestic military buildup, the government increased 
international security cooperation with its partners, including Australia and India, under the 
auspices of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In May 2005, the Koizumi government, with its U.S. and 
Australian counterparts, established an annual Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) in order to 
strengthen bilateral links with Australia and embed Japan within the wider structure of the U.S. 
alliance while increasing U.S. regional security ties. Prime Minister Koizumi and his successor, 
Shinzo Abe (2006-07), appeared to perceive the trilateral talks as an important means of 
mobilizing the three key democracies in the region in order to counter a rising China. Moreover, 
in December 2006, Abe forged the “Strategic and Global Partnership” with India, entailing 
cooperation on maritime security, and was supportive of attempts by the Bush administration to 
develop quadrilateral security cooperation between Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. 
These four countries, along with Singapore, held joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean in 
September 2007.  
 Simultaneously, bilateral security ties between Japan and Australia culminated in the 
signing of a Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in March 2007, also 
known as a “quasi-alliance.” The joint declaration emphasizes broad cooperation on issues such 
as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as more direct military cooperation in 
peacekeeping, defense exchanges, search and rescue, and participation in the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI). In June 2007, the two countries established their own “2+2” foreign- 
and defense-ministers’ dialogue, and concluded a “Comprehensive Strategic, Security, and 
Economic Partnership” in June the following year. Under the partnership, both countries sought 
to build cooperation through strategic information sharing in the Indian Ocean and South China 
Sea, PSI, and anti-piracy activities. They have also begun integrating their intelligence and forces 
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into U.S. global and regional strategy for missile defense, especially sharing missile launch 
detection data.
166
 
 
Reforming the Institutionalized Yoshida Doctrine 
 Concomitant with increasing Japan’s military capabilities and security cooperation with 
the important partners in the region, the normalist leaders attacked the postwar bureaucratic 
regime that had sustained the Yoshida Doctrine. First, Prime Minister Koizumi weakened the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB). The CLB, as argued before, had played a central role in 
managing the Yoshida Doctrine by providing strict constitutional interpretations, including the 
1952 definition of “war potential” and the 1981 ban on collective self-defense, which had 
significantly downsized the SDF’s military capabilities and security roles. The problem, from the 
normalist perspective, was that CLB officials had worked closely with the LDP mercantilists in 
the past to severely constrain the country’s security profile. Therefore, Koizumi sought to exert 
more political power over the bureaucratic privilege. Under the new regime, the director general 
could no longer answer Diet interpellations on behalf of cabinet ministers—a practice often done 
to maintain the CLB’s voice in issues regarding constitutional interpretation. The CLB was 
forced to conduct its business on a very short political leash, making it difficult for the institution 
to issue more noncongenial interpretations. The same CLB that ruled in 1996 that “it is 
problematic to amend the law to enable the prime minister to control and supervise the ministries 
and agencies—even during an emergency” came under fuller political control.167 
 The political reform also targeted the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). Throughout the 
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postwar period, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) took overall responsibility for devising 
security policy, whereas the JDA was regarded a junior partner in security policymaking. 
Lacking full ministerial status, the JDA was incorporated into the Prime Minister’s Office. In an 
attempt to keep military officers out of the institution under the principle of civilian control, the 
Internal Bureau (naikyoku) of the JDA was overseen by civilian defense counselors (sanjikan). 
These civilian assistants were seconded from other ministries, including the MOFA, the Ministry 
of Finance, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). The JDA’s administrative 
vice-minister and top bureaucrat were generally a MOFA or METI official on secondment. 
Overtaken by the opinions of other ministries’ officers with no defense policy experience, the 
JDA was unable to exert its own influence in security planning. Some analysts even suggest that 
these civilian-control practices have been strict to the point of compromising the basic functions 
of the SDF to defend the nation.
168
 
 Koizumi and his allies also weakened the councilors in the JDA, which were part of the 
current regime that had devalued the institution. JDA Director General Ishiba forcefully argued 
that the politicians who understood national security issues should assume control of defense 
planning and should no longer depend on the councilors as their proxies. He also elevated the 
status of senior military officers in each service branch to the equivalent of the councilors, 
allowing military officials to have more influence in the policymaking within the Internal Bureau. 
In addition to the tradition of posting junior politicians to each ministry as parliamentary vice 
ministers to educate them about policy issues, Koizumi and his followers appointed senior 
lawmakers as vice ministers to give politicians even more supervisory influence in 
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policymaking. 
 Koizumi’s successor Shinzo Abe (2006-07) continued these reform efforts by promoting 
the JDA to the full ministerial level. As a result, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) is now gaining 
more ground in security policymaking. The MOD’s new-found confidence in its status was 
evinced when, in 2007, Takemasa Moriya, a career ministry official and then-administrative 
vice-minister, resisted attempts to impose a secondment from the National Policy Agency (NPA) 
as his successor, insisting instead on an internal promotion.
169
 As seen in the “2+2” dialogues 
with the United States and Australia, the MOD now enjoys equal footing with the MOFA in 
security negotiations. The MOD also possesses the same budgetary authority as other ministries 
so that it no longer needs to go through the cumbersome process of consulting with the Cabinet 
Office (naikakuhu) before gaining Prime Minister’s approval when proposing the defense budget. 
The same procedure applies to decisions regarding mobilizing the SDF, which will allow for the 
swift deployment of the force in times of emergency under the decision of the Defense 
Ministry.
170
 
 
Meeting Public Opposition: The Limits of Normalist Policies 
 Despite these incremental but tangible steps toward a more robust security policy, the 
normalist leaders again met the shoals of public opposition as they had in the 1990s, leaving 
much of their agenda unimplemented. Prime Minister Abe, for example, tumbled on the most 
controversial topic of constitutional revision—an unavoidable issue when expanding Japan’s 
security profile due to its constraints on the nation’s use of force. During his campaign to become 
LDP leader and Japanese prime minister, Abe expressed his clear intention to seek constitutional 
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revision, and, after winning the election, made this issue a top priority of his agenda.
171
 
Subsequently, Abe put forward legislation in the Diet to create the formal procedures for the 
national referendum required for revising the constitution. Inheriting a two-thirds 
“super-majority” in the Lower House from his popular predecessor Koizumi, Abe resorted to a 
forceful, partisan stance in passing the legislation in May 2006. The prime minister then moved 
to campaign on the issue of constitutional revision in the September 2007 election for the Upper 
House.
172
  
 However, Abe’s passion for revising the constitution did not resonate well with the 
public, who did not view the issue as urgent when problems of economic stagnation and 
inequality in Japanese society appeared more pressing. The LDP experienced a historic loss in 
the election, losing the majority in the Upper House. Following Abe’s consequent fall from 
power, the successive and ephemeral Yasuo Fukuda and Taro Aso administrations (both only 
staying in office about one year) did not have the stomach for pursuing controversial 
constitutional revision. The debate on revising the constitution soon faded away. 
 Behind the government’s reluctance was also the fact that the public’s support for 
constitutional revision appeared to be declining. According to a 2004 public poll by Yomiuri 
Shimbun, support for revising the constitution reached a record high of 65 percent, with only 
22.7 percent opposing revision. In spring 2008, however, a narrow majority opposed revision for 
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the first time since 1993.
173
 Analysts attribute this change to the public’s alarm surrounding the 
perceived rise of nationalistic discourses during the Abe administration. In parallel with the 
ideological attitudes of the Abe government, hawkish nationalist intellectuals and commentators 
came to occupy Japan’s mass media, with some calling for drastic military expansion and more 
autonomous defense, and others even denying the postwar Japanese identity.
174
 The partisan 
manner in which Abe pushed the national referendum law did not help cultivate a broad 
consensus among the Japanese people either, who came to understand the issue in a partisan 
rather than pragmatic frame. Despite their support for BMD system to address the North Korea’s 
missile threat, the public remained alarmed with what appeared to be a “rightward drift” in 
Japanese society and rhetoric. 
 Regarding their country’s nuclearization, the Japanese people also remained cautious. 
Against the backdrop of North Korea’s detonation of a small nuclear device in October 2006, 
right-leaning politicians, such as former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, Foreign Minister 
Taro Aso, and LDP policy chief Shoichi Nakagawa, argued for a debate on the nuclear option.
175
 
However, the antinuclear sentiment among the Japanese public that had endured since 1945 still 
remained incredibly potent. A public poll conducted at the time showed that 78 percent of 
Japanese citizens opposed nuclear armament, while only 14 percent supported the option.
176
 In 
light of such public opposition, Prime Minister Abe, despite his reputation as a hawk, rejected the 
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nuclear option, declaring that Japan would adhere to its non-nuclear principle and would not 
further debate this issue within his government. The discussion on nuclear armament remained 
closed when his successors, Fukuda and Aso, were in office. 
 The same negative reaction to militarization was seen during the war on terror. The 
Japanese public showed weak support for SDF participation in the Afghanistan war although the 
deployment was mainly a logistical, noncombat mission in support of the U.S.-led military action. 
A public poll taken in November 2001 showed 44 percent showed support for and 48 percent 
expressed opposition to the SDF mission in the Indian Ocean.
177
 The dispatch of Aegis 
destroyers to the mission, because it implicated military involvement, also proved unpopular and 
contentious among the public and even within the ruling LDP-led coalition. Consequently, the 
Koizumi government was not able to justify the deployment on military grounds but to claim that 
the dispatch was a way to enhance the amenities available for SDF sailors.
178
 Moreover, when 
the antiterrorist special legislation needed a renewal for continuing the mission in fall 2007, the 
LDP government, due to opposition from the public and the DPJ, had to defend the renewal as 
providing noncombat support for a U.N.-centered mission designed to interdict weapons and 
drugs and maintain maritime security rather than directly linking it to the war on terror or the war 
in Afghanistan.
179
 
 The Iraq War also encountered public opposition against military involvement. After 
dispatching the SDF for humanitarian efforts in Iraq, Koizumi sought to provide a more military 
contribution by providing a novel constitutional interpretation. In his press conference 
announcing Japan’s participation in the Iraq war on December 9, 2003, he suggested that more 
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important than the war-renouncing Article 9 was the preamble of the constitution, which 
obligates Japan to contribute to the realization of high ideals in the world, such as the banishment 
of tyranny and oppression and promotion of international peace. Koizumi cited sections of the 
constitution: “We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone… We, the Japanese people, 
pledge our national honors to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.” 
He then concluded, “Indeed, I believe the international community is calling upon Japan, and the 
people of Japan to act in accordance with the ideals of our Constitution.”180 By arguing such an 
interpretation, Koizumi appeared to be trying to persuade public opinion to accept broader 
missions for the SDF beyond humanitarian and reconstruction operations. 
 However, his ambition to upgrade Japanese security profile did not resonate well with 
the public, who remained dissatisfied with Koizumi’s explanation. The public poll following the 
press conference found 63 percent of respondents expressing dissatisfaction with Koizumi’s 
justification of Japan’s participation in the Iraq war, as opposed to only 23 percent showing 
satisfaction. Another poll demonstrated that the approval rating for the prime minister declined 
from 47 percent to 41 percent after the speech. This trend continued for weeks after the press 
conference, as 85.7 percent believed the prime minister had not provided adequate explanation 
for the SDF deployment, versus only 10.7 percent who viewed his explanation adequate.
181
 
Facing these dismal public polls, Koizumi and other members of his cabinet stopped advancing 
their hawkish arguments for expanding the SDF’s security missions in Iraq. Instead of suggesting 
that Japan had an obligation to send military forces overseas to overthrow tyranny and promote 
peace, the Japanese government justified the Iraq deployment as a purely humanitarian and 
reconstruction operation, as it did for the Cambodian UN PKO mission ten years earlier. 
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 Japan’s participation in the war on terror was certainly a historic event considering the 
nation’s longstanding low-key security profile. Japan’s participation, however, remained a 
logistical supporting role in the Indian Ocean and essentially noncombatant and humanitarian in 
Iraq. In enhancing security in and assisting with the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the 
government sent financial assistance instead of its armed force, and was in fact the 
second-largest investor in the country between 2001 and 2011.
182
 The war on terror was 
definitely a step toward Japan’s expanding security role as a “normal nation,” but the approach 
itself chiefly maintained more of a civilian, rather than military, one that a “global civilian power” 
would find appropriate. 
 The recent normalization process has also suffered from financial constraints on 
Japanese defense spending. Defense expenditure has in fact kept within the GNP 1 percent limit 
already officially abandoned by former Prime Minister Nakasone in the late 1980s. It even 
consistently declined for ten consecutive years since 2002. Japanese military capabilities have 
been indeed strengthened in quality with the recent procurements. However, these financial 
constrains have significantly limited the caliber of remilitarization. 
 Consequently, despite the emerging normalization of its security policy, Japan has not 
yet reasserted itself as a normal great military power. While assuming a larger international 
security role and strengthening its defense force to confront regional security challenges, it still 
remains hesitant to pursue a drastic course of militarization or use its newly acquired military 
might for the pursuit of its national interest. Rather, Japan prefers a civilian approach to 
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international security instead of the use of force, unlike other great powers such as France or 
Great Britain that routinely send forces on combat missions across the globe. Japan’s identity 
therefore remains to be somewhere in between, or a mosaic, of a “normal nation” and “global 
civilian power.” The Yoshida Doctrine, which has significantly deemphasized Japan’s use of 
force for more than a half century, was not entirely replaced but rather was restructured and thus 
endured in the twenty-first century. 
 
After the 2009 Election: A New Party in Power, a New Identity for Japan? 
 The arrival of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio and the DPJ in office after the 2009 
election raised interesting questions about how a non-LDP administration would settle existing 
alternative identities for Japan. The DPJ, which has a more internationalist bent than the LDP, 
put a greater emphasis on the UN and multilateralism and the relations with an emergent East 
Asian regional community, and therefore possessed a potential penchant for the global civilian 
power vision. However, before reversing the trend toward normalization, the DPJ political 
foundation rapidly collapsed while facing a series of international and domestic challenges. The 
DPJ administration eventually came close to embracing the LDP’s normalist foreign policy 
agenda. This suggests that there seems to be an emerging national consensus on Japan’s identity 
as a “normal nation,” though this “normalcy” still does not equate to great military power status. 
 The DPJ came into office with a vision of Japan’s grand strategy significantly different 
from the LDP’s, with their stronger focus on achieving the East Asian Community (EAC) and a 
more symmetrical balance of power (seisankakkeiron) among Japan, the United States, and 
China. The DPJ leaders have argued that the LDP has been overly simplistic in asserting that as 
long as U.S.-Japan relations were healthy, then positive East Asia-Japan relations would follow. 
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According to the DJP, Japan has been “too dependent on the United States” (Beikoku ni izon 
shisugita) and needed to form a more Asia-focused policy and a more symmetric 
U.S.-China-Japan triangle.
183
 Therefore, they argued that East Asian regionalism should serve as 
the bedrock of Japan’s grand strategy and that the EAC should be the prime vehicle for 
establishing greater regional institutionalization. The purpose is not either to counterbalance or to 
contain China; rather it is to enmesh China (Chugoku o koritsu sasezu, Ajia nonaka ni makikomi) 
within a more effective macroregional framework in order to provide the necessary collective 
leverage among East Asian states to actively engage against any shift toward Chinese unipolarity. 
Put differently, the DPJ has embraced the emerging multipolarity in East Asia and has attempted 
to maintain friendly relations under one regional framework. As a result, the DPJ has been 
reluctant to follow the LDP’s course of depending on and cooperating with the United States to 
maintain U.S. unipolarity and counterbalance against rising China.
184
 
 However, their foreign policy strategy fell into a quagmire after a series of diplomatic 
disasters, which led the new party in power to reconsider its policymaking and ultimately to 
follow the LDP’s normalist security policy agendas. The first diplomatic disaster was the 
mishandling of the U.S. base issue in Okinawa. While implementing the 2009 campaign 
manifesto of removing the U.S. military bases from the islands, the Hatoyama government 
attempted to reverse the 2006 Road Map, in which the previous LDP administrations managed to 
forge an agreement with local and U.S. governments for relocating the Futenma base from the 
densely populated area to Henoko, a less populated area in the north.
185
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 However, Hatoyama’s abrupt move understandably aroused the Obama administration’s 
concerns about Japanese intentions. This was further compounded with the seemingly poor 
communication with the new DJP government via spokesmen, divisions between the State and 
Defense departments over how to respond, and then Defense Secretary Robert Gate’s outright 
rejection of renegotiation during his trip to Japan in October 2009. It was, as one analyst has 
called, a “mini-crisis in U.S.-Japan relations.”186 
 In the midst of such a diplomatic crisis, Hatoyama had nowhere to go, without a vision 
of where else to relocate the Futenma base and sufficient consultation with the local populations 
on alternative sites. He then slowly moved to reverse his stance on the issue and to accept the 
2006 agreement, but only to find himself in the fierce public uproar and consequent calls for 
resignation even from his own party. Before realizing his foreign policy objectives, the new 
prime minister resigned in June 2010, only months after the historic landslide election that 
eliminated the LDP from power for only the second time since 1955. 
 Hatoyama’s successor Naoto Kan also faced a diplomatic obstacle: the Senkaku Islands 
territorial dispute. In September 2010, Japanese officials arrested a Chinese captain whose 
fishing boat collided with two Japanese Coast Guard patrol ships near the islands. This 
detainment evoked a number of vociferous actions from China: a call for the captain’s release, 
accusations against Japan of endangering the safety of Chinese fishermen and fishing boats in 
waters near China’s territory, and a deployment of Chinese patrol ships near the islands. The 
Chinese government maintained its retaliatory response even after Japanese officials released the 
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captain, demanding Japan’s apology and compensation, allowing anti-Japan protests and 
continuing deployment of patrol ships and military assets near the islands in the following 
months. In response, President Barack Obama, State Secretary Hilary Clinton, and Defense 
Secretary, one after another, declared that the Senkakus are covered by the U.S.-Japan security 
treaty, promising that the United States would side with Japan in times of emergency. The 
Senkaku issue was emerging as a tangible security concern and testament of Chinese 
assertiveness in the region, threatening the optimistic prospect of establishing the East Asian 
Community while testifying the importance of U.S. security guarantee in the region. The DPJ 
government now needed to rethink its security policy and alliance with the United States. 
 The DPJ government ultimately chose a more robust defense posture and security 
cooperation with the United States—de facto continuation of the LDP’s normalist policy. The 
2010 National Defense Program Guidelines abandoned the longstanding “Basic Defense Force 
Concept” and adopted a new concept of “Dynamic Defense Force.” The new concept calls for 
the SDF’s enhanced readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability and versatility, reinforced by 
advanced technology and intelligence capabilities. The goal of the new force structure is to 
become able to deter and repel small-scale opportunistic or fait accompli expansion with an 
immediate and seamless response.
187
  
 Clearly, the scenario in mind was expulsion of Chinese intrusion into the Senkakus. In 
fact, the 2010 NDPG mandated “the SDF will permanently station the minimum necessary units 
on off-shore islands where the SDF is not currently stationed” and secure “bases, mobility, 
transport capacity and effective countermeasures necessary for conducting operations against… 
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attacks [on these islands].” The NDPG called for deployment of a GSDF force of 1,000 troops as 
a “coastal monitoring” unit on Yonaguni, the closest inhabited Japanese island to the Senkakus. 
The DPJ also promoted the establishment of an amphibious-assault unit (similar to the U.S. 
Marine Corps in function) in the GSDF, as a means to boost the defense of the southern islands. 
Meanwhile, the SDF has been increasingly engaging in military exercises designed to address 
any future amphibious attacks on offshore islands on Kyushu and Okinawa for responding to 
amphibious attacks on offshore islands. It also has conducted similar training exercises with U.S. 
troops in the wake of the August 2012 Chinese activists landing on the Senkakus and the 
following repeated intrusions by Chinese vessels into Japanese territorial waters near the islands. 
 In the 2011 “2+2” ministerial meeting with the United States, the Japanese government 
essentially promised to maintain the 2006 Road Map, while at the same time pledged to 
cooperate with its ally in maintaining regional order, with its newly structured Dynamic Defense 
Force. The joint declaration listed areas of cooperation including missile defense and protection 
of the freedom of navigation and safe and secure sea lines of communication, which implicitly 
referred to the Chinese increasing ballistic missile capabilities and assertive behavior in both the 
South and East China Seas. The list also included intelligence operations and cyberspace, among 
other things, and spoke of a U.S.-Japan Space Security Dialogue following the 2008 lifting of the 
ban on use of space for military purposes. 
 Moreover, following the joint declaration, the Japanese government moved to relax its 
longstanding ban on the export of weapons and military equipment. This move would provide 
the country with opportunities to participate in multinational development projects on everything 
from missile defense systems to fighter jets. It opens international market for Japanese defense 
corporations, which is expected to reduce the costs of procurement for the SDF. The ban would 
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also allow the country to export military equipment for peacekeeping missions and international 
cooperation such as UN PKO. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Kan’s successor, Yoshihiko Noda, 
even showed his willingness to exercise the right of collective-defense, stating “We want to make 
detailed discussions (on a review of the interpretation) within the government” in a Diet 
session.
188
 Clearly, the opposition DPJ had moved to come to terms with the normalist agendas 
of the previous LDP administrations. 
 However, none of this is to say that the penchant for a more civilian approach has 
vanished. Having consistently opposed U.S. use of force overseas during the 2000s, the 
Hatoyama administration terminated the SDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. Instead, the 
DPJ put together a $5 billion package over five years for civilian support for Afghan 
reconstruction programs including police training, employment of former combatants, and 
development of agriculture and energy. In line with this civilian approach, the DPJ government 
dispatched the SDF to Haiti for a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and 
reconstruction mission, following the 2010 devastating earthquake in the country. The DPJ later 
approved a SDF deployment to South Sudan for a noncombat reconstruction mission in the 
aftermath of the state’s long-awaited independence. As it has been a strong proponent of overseas 
deployments of the SDF for UN centric non-combat HADR and reconstruction, the DPJ 
willingly approved these operations, keeping its civilian power stance. The Japanese public was 
also in favor of their country’s civilian posture. A 2012 public poll by Cabinet Office 
demonstrated an overwhelming majority of 87.4 percent expressed their support for SDF 
peacekeeping missions.
189
 In its use of force for international security, Japan has still retained its 
                                                 
188
 Asahi Shimbun, July 10, 2012, Accessed April 30, 2013. 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201207100073. Noda later clarified that his government would 
not seek to change the existing constitutional interpretation while still advocating for meaningful debate on the issue. 
189
 Mainichi Shimbun, May 1, 2012, Accessed April 30, 2013. 
  
93 
civilian posture, despite the emerging wave of normalization. It is therefore this combination, or 
a mosaic, of normalist and internationalist identities that characterizes Japan’s current identity. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I described Japan’s identity construction and security policy during the 
Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Specifically, I argued that the country has undergone two 
identity crises, each in the aftermath of the Second World War and the Cold War. In the first 
identity crisis, the mercantilist camp emerged as a hegemonic identity, incorporated the pacifist 
principles into its foreign policy, and presented the state as a “merchant nation” and a “peace 
nation” under the Yoshida Doctrine, a grand strategy comprising both mercantilism and pacifism. 
This doctrine (1) prioritized economic development, (2) minimized the state’s defense spending 
and international security role and (3) led the state to rely on the U.S. for its security. The 
doctrine ultimately set Japan on a path to becoming a peaceful economic power rather than a 
great military power.  
 The second identity crisis occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War, which presented 
new security challenges to Japan such as the Gulf War, North Korean missile and nuclear 
programs, China’s military expansion, and the war on terror. In this second identity crisis, the 
normalist camp has emerged as a new hegemonic identity, incorporating elements of the 
internationalist perspectives in a subordinate fashion. This new dynamic of contestation shifted 
Japan’s identity to one characterized as a “normal nation” that has a greater international security 
role and military capabilities, but also as a “global civilian power” that emphasizes its use of 
forces for humanitarian noncombat missions in promoting the world’s peace and security rather 
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than for an aggressive pursuit of its national interests. Therefore, the new security policy is more 
nuanced than pure militant realism, and the new national identity less drastic than a muscular, 
“normal” Japan defined by realists. 
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Policy Implications 
 In this chapter, I attempt to explore policy implications of the findings established in the 
earlier chapters. I have depicted the recent transformation of Japanese security policy as a result 
of the internal contestation between two identity groups—normalist and internationalist—and its 
consequent “mosaic” nature of Japan’s new identity consisting of two different part-identities. 
This mosaic picture presents us long-term implications for Tokyo’s evolving security strategy. 
 First, Japan will gradually eliminate the constraints on, and enhance the capabilities of, 
its military force for fully conducting operations related to homeland defense. Despite its 
constitutional and other legal constraints, Japan has proceeded to procure a BMD system in 
response to the perceived threats of North Korean and Chinese ballistic missile programs while 
moving to accept space activities for military purposes. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
these moves for building a more robust military posture, despite its controversial nature, have 
gained considerable support among both Japanese policymakers and public. In addition, the 
legislation enabling these procurements have mustered votes from parties across the aisle, and 
the vast majority of the public has showed their support every time the BMD system was 
deployed in anticipation of North Korean missile launches. 
 Among these domestic developments in homeland defense, the Senkaku Islands 
territorial dispute is arguably the most highlighted and time-sensitive case in point. This 
longstanding issue between China and Japan has nearly scaled up to nearly the point of a 
potential armed conflict since the Chinese intrusion into, and the Japanese nationalization of, 
these islands in the summer of 2012. Since then, there have been a number of Chinese intrusions 
into Japan’s territorial waters and even territorial airspace. Once, Chinese and Japanese fighter 
jets came to the scene when the Chinese government sent a civilian surveillance plane near the 
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disputed islands.
190
 In response, Japan’s security ally, the United States, has demonstrated its 
commitment to guarding the islands if they come under attack by Chinese military force. 
However, such reassurance of the American deterrence guarantee cannot completely assuage the 
fears of Japanese policymakers, when it is conceivable that U.S. policymakers would not 
willingly take a course of entrapment by committing to such a futile military fight over the small 
rocks in the vast East China Sea, instead expecting Japan to take necessary steps to defend its 
own territory.  
 In response to such concerns, the Japanese government has been taking steps to bolster 
its defense on the southeast, including increased military exercises for territorial defense and the 
recent purchase of four AAV-7s (amphibious assault vehicle).
191
 The procurement of AAVs 
signals Japanese increased concerns for and commitments to defending its territory, as the 
offensive-oriented nature of the crafts may violate the longstanding principle of exclusively 
defense-oriented policy of the SDF. In January of this year, the Japanese Defense Ministry even 
announced its plan to strengthen its security over the Senkaku Islands by deploying U.S. Global 
Hawk unmanned drones over its territory in the East China Sea.
192
 
 And the Japanese public appears to be supportive of these moves toward a more robust 
defense posture. The January 2012 public poll by Cabinet Office shows that a vast majority of 
71.5 percent (a big increase from 60.1 percent in 2011) selecting “national defense” as an area 
where the SDF should put more focus. Behind this perception lie concerns about the Chinese 
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military.
193
 The latest public poll conducted by The Genron NPO and the China Daily in June 
2012 shows that 58.7 percent of the Japanese pubic regarded China as a military threat, the 
highest number since the poll was begun in 2005.
194
 This increased commitment to homeland 
defense, or a more “normal” security posture, seems to be a continuing trend as long as the 
security concerns surrounding China endure. 
 Second, as a result of the first trend, Japan will incrementally reduce its dependence on 
the United States in many areas as the SDF becomes more capable in traditional national defense 
operations. Postwar Japanese security policy, at least until the end of the Cold War, had been 
marked by its total dependence on the American deterrence guarantee. Jennifer Lind has argued 
this security strategy adheres to defense realism’s “buck-passing” strategy, a balancing act 
against a threat mainly through relying on the efforts of others rather than its own.
195
 The recent 
transformation of Japanese security policy then exemplifies a move toward more of buck-sharing 
in the bilateral security arrangement, at least as far as homeland defense is concerned. By 
acquiring more advanced military capabilities and removing constrain on the use of force, Japan 
is stepping toward shouldering its own share of responsibility in defending its territory. 
 However, none of this suggests that Tokyo is now abandoning the American security 
guarantee and seeking to establish military independence or autonomous defense. Such calls for 
autonomous defense do exist among the right-wing nationalists in the normalist camp, such as 
Shintaro Ishihara, who would like to see Japan extricate itself from its dependence on U.S. forces 
and establish an autonomous defense posture even through nuclearization. However, as seen in 
                                                 
193
 Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, “Public Poll Regarding the Self-Defense Force and Defense Issues,” 
January 2012, Accessed April 30, 2013. http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h23/h23-bouei/index.html. 
194
 Genron NPO, “Dai Hachi Kai Nichu Kyodo Yoron Chosa ni tsuite” [The Eighth Japan-China Joint Public Poll], 
June 20, 2012, Accessed April 30, 2013. http://www.genron-npo.net/world/genre/cat119/2012-a.html. According to 
the same poll, majorities choose China’s continuous military buildup (61.5 percent), disputes over territory and 
maritime resources (55.2 percent), and little information available on China’s military capabilities (51.8 percent) as 
the reasons for viewing China as a military threat. 
195
 Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?” 
  
98 
the previous chapters, such nationalistic demands have not gained any significant support from 
the Japanese people but rather warned them against the “rightward drift” in Japanese society, or 
such a radical representation of Japan as “a normal nation.” Japan’s intention is rather modest; 
the country is just struggling to assume a more “equal” responsibility in the bilateral security 
alliance. 
 Third, Japan is very unlikely to agree to make certain military contributions, such as 
participation in joint combat operations or stand-alone security and stabilization missions with 
U.S.-led or U.N.-led coalition forces, in theaters such as Afghanistan or Iraq that are distant and 
involve missions not directly linked to Japan’s territorial defense. As in the case of the war on 
terror, the Japanese people still have little tolerance for their forces participating in military 
missions abroad, especially in armed conflict that does not, in their view, threaten national 
security. When the country commits itself to such overseas war efforts, it will very likely remain 
a supplementary, logistical role that does not involve combat operations. But even such 
nonmilitary missions are not welcomed by the Japanese people as in the case of the refueling 
mission in the Indian Ocean.  
 Rather, the public would like to see their forces contributing to international peace and 
security in a civilian fashion such as humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and disaster relief 
missions, or their country providing financial assistance for these humanitarian efforts. And this 
civilian approach is what Tokyo has adopted since the end of the Cold War: participation in U.N. 
PKO noncombat operations, the humanitarian mission in Iraq, and the five billion dollars ODA 
package for Afghanistan reconstruction. Despite the emerging wave of normalization of its 
security policy, Japan has remained “a global civilian power” in promoting international peace 
and security. 
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 Lastly, these three trends suggest that Japan is neither boosting up its security posture 
for a great power ambition nor becoming a normal great military power. The military buildup in 
response to the new security challenges, such as China’s rapid militarization and assertive 
behavior in its surrounding seas and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, remains to be 
purely defensive in its intention. The Japanese government does not aspire to great power status 
in its recent military efforts, or to pursuit of its national interests through using its newly acquired 
military capabilities. To call the new nation’s military posture “a normal military power,”196 as 
realists might, is also misleading as the country is still inhibited in the use of force, unlike other 
military powers such as Great Britain and France that routinely send military forces for combat 
missions across the globe. 
 This enlightened portrait of Japan’s new “normal” security policy also reveals a striking 
continuation of the Yoshida Doctrine. Yet, the recent transformation of security policy has indeed 
led many analysts to question the relevancy of the doctrine today, including Kenneth Pyle, who 
has declared it “a dead letter.”197 This characterization, however, is misleading. Despite the 
nationalist demands for autonomous defense from the right-wing fringe of society, the country 
has remained content with the U.S. military presence in the region as the status-quo power and 
stabilizer, and has moved to maintain the U.S. military superiority by assuming more 
responsibility in the bilateral arrangement. As Yoshihide Soeya describes, Japan has remained, 
and continues to be, a “middle power” that is closely bounded by U.S. military strategy, and 
whose role remains a supplementary one to that strategy, rather than playing an independent 
one.
198
 Moreover, this supplemental role emphasizes nonmilitary, logistic missions as in the case 
of the refueling operation in the Indian Ocean, or humanitarian ones as in the case of U.N. PKO 
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operations. Japan’s military role continues to be as deemphasized as it has traditionally been 
under the Yoshida strategy during the Cold War. The Yoshida Doctrine is not entirely displaced 
but updated to the new security environment while reflecting the new articulation of the 
country’s identity. 
 Whether all these trends continue for decades to come of course remains to be seen, as 
the former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a forthright normalist, has regained power. Determined to 
implement the unfinished agenda during his last term, he has already promised to resume the 
process of constitutional revision to establish a “national defense military” (kokubogun) and 
recognize the right of collective self-defense. He has also proposed to increase defense 
expenditure for the coming fiscal year of 2013, which has been contracting for ten consecutive 
years since 2002. The Japanese public seems to be showing support for increasing the country’s 
defense capabilities. The recent poll in Yomiuri Shimbun conducted in the mid-January 2013 
shows 54 percent expressing support, versus 36 percent expressing opposition.
199
 The new 
prime minister has also demonstrated his commitment to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security 
cooperation by playing a more active role in light of the intensifying security concerns over 
China and North Korea.  
 None of this, however, has seemed to suggest a drastic derailment from the 
aforementioned trends. Japan will likely continue its normalization process by beefing up its 
security posture in homeland defense and in the U.S. security alliance, but still only commit itself 
to nonmilitary and civilian missions when called upon to contribute to international peace and 
security. At least it is safe to confidently affirm that Japan is not becoming a great power with 
full-blown rearmament including nuclear capabilities and using its force overseas in pursuing its 
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national interests, as some neorealists have predicted.
200
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Theoretical Implications 
 In the previous chapters, I have illustrated that the making of Japanese security policy 
was a product of the internal contestation among identity groups, or part-identities, which have 
different visions of national interest and identity in forming Japan’s identity as a whole, or 
whole-identity. Through the contestation, a dominant, or hegemonic, identity group emerges and 
incorporates perspectives of other subordinate groups, constructing the whole-identity that can be 
best described as a “mosaic” of multiple discourses. This model of identity construction presents 
us a number of serious theoretical implications for the field of IR. 
 First, a state cannot be treated as a unitary actor with a pre-given set of interests or as a 
black-box that conducts its foreign policy independent of its internal political dynamics. The 
materialist schools of IR theory, such realism and liberalism, have depicted state actors unitary, 
calculating actors who seek to maximize their interests following the logic of military or 
economic expediency. This rationalist approach assumes interests are exogenous to (i.e., prior to 
or separate from) social interaction and therefore states have a pre-existing set of interests. State 
behavior is then just a rational response to the material conditions of the external environment. 
For rationalists, what happens within states is insignificant: States are reduced to a mere 
black-box. Ignoring the domestic context explains why the rationalists, especially realists, have 
confronted the two puzzles regarding Japanese security policy: (1) the postwar minimalist 
security posture despite its economic might and (2) the recent normalization of that posture that 
still deviates from the realist prediction of becoming a great military power. 
 However, as I have illustrated in the earlier chapters, the development and 
implementation of Japan’s security policy has been deeply grounded in its domestic political 
dynamics, i.e. the internal contestation among the competing identity groups. Japan has indeed 
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been responding to the material conditions of the external environment, but this response was 
mediated through the internal context in which the domestic actors constantly construct social 
meanings out of the international (and national) events and propose new visions of national 
interest and identity based on those meanings. As Keiko Hirata writes: 
A state’s foreign policy is shaped by the international environment and the domestic 
political context in which political actors interpret national and international events, 
compete with each other, and make their views prevail. The development and 
implementation of security policy in Japan, as elsewhere, involves competing 
interpretations of state identity and political conflict among the actors who promote 
these differing interpretations.
201
 
 
It is this complex foreign-domestic interaction that determines Japan’s foreign policy. Therefore, 
without moving beyond the black-box rhetoric and accounting for these dynamics at work, one 
can hardly explain Japan’s (or, for that matter, any states’) foreign and security policy. 
 Second, the negation of the black-box rhetoric raises the importance of ideas in 
international politics. The rationalist school of IR theory pays attention to only material factors 
such as distribution of military and economic power as the basis of its analysis of state behavior. 
It is true that the realist prediction of Japan’s more assertive security policy does seem to align 
with the current trajectory of the “normalization” process. Irrespective of the role of ideas in 
international politics, Japan (or any state for that matter) may follow the supposed-to-be “rational” 
course of realist security policy. To this extent, certain material forces (e.g. North Korea’s 
existential missile threat, especially combined with the nuclear program) appear to have 
independent effects on state behavior (e.g. Japan’s controversial development and deployment of 
a BMD system).
202
 However, this argument does not deny the fact that domestic political actors 
                                                 
201
 Hirata, “Who Shapes the National Security Debate?,” 147. 
202
 This point corresponds to Wendt’s “rump materialism,” which makes a “significant idealist concession to 
materialism” by admitting that “interests are not ideas all the way down.” Wendt argues so by acknowledging 
because brute material forces such as an existential threat posed by the nuclear weapons do have independent effects 
on international politics, “ideas are based on and are regulated by an independently existing physical reality.” Wendt, 
  
104 
construct social meanings about national interest and identity out of material conditions, and 
form foreign policy based on those meanings: whether Japan should become “a normal nation” 
by claiming greater defense capabilities and a more assertive security posture. In other words, 
material interests are meaning-laden and can be interpreted in a variety of ways and produce 
different policy effects depending on the interpretation. Therefore, ideas matter as much as 
material reality does in determining state behavior. 
 Also, disregarding the role of ideas in its analysis, one can hardly account for the 
meanings and intentions behind states’ actions, which can differ even when these actions take 
similar forms. This point is especially important when one can misconstrue Japan’s intention 
behind its more assertive security policy as the realist prediction of a great military power 
ambition, while the intention is more benign to become just “a normal nation,” and this normalcy 
is even less militaristic due to its mosaic aspect that incorporates the “global civilian power” 
approach. 
 Third, the state identity construction process via contestation among competing identity 
groups serves as a causal mechanism between the changes in the international security 
environment (exogenous shocks) and the identity shift (endogenous change). As seen above, the 
internal contestation is always subject to changes in the state’s interactions with other states and 
position in the international system as the domestic actors are discussing the vision of the state 
that would be appropriate in this international context. If the international context changes, the 
domestic actors will propose alternative accounts of national interest and identity as responses to 
such changes. This new dynamics in the contestation then leads to a new articulation of identity, 
or an identity shift. Put differently, changes in the external balance of power among states 
(material change) influence the internal dynamics and balance of power among competing 
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identity groups which read such material conditions through their different ideational frames, and 
produce a new identity (ideational change), and vice versa. This is why the domestic actors in 
Japan have proposed new visions for the country—a “normal nation” and a “global civilian 
power”—in addressing the new security environment of the post-Cold War order, and 
consequently constructed a new state identity that incorporates principles of both visions. This 
internal change, in turn, changes Japan’s position and the balance of power in the international 
system. In sum, the contestation process serves as a mediator between exogenous changes in the 
international system and endogenous transformations of the intrastate identity variable. 
 It is important to note that this perspective is rendered possible because of the holistic 
constructivist approach that I have adopted in my identity construction model. The existing 
constructivist accounts of Japanese security policy such as Thomas Berger’s and Peter 
Katzenstein’s have taken the form of unit-level constructivism and only focused on the internal 
political dynamics that have created what they call a “culture of antimilitarism.” According to 
their account, this culture of antimilitarism has contributed to Japan’s minimalist military posture 
despite its economic prowess, or its antimilitarist identity. Katzenstein goes further by saying 
“Japan’s security policy will continue to be shaped by the domestic rather than the international 
balance of power.”203 While he correctly pays attention to the domestic political dynamics in 
arguing for the influences of internal cultural norms on foreign policy decisions, Katzenstein 
seems to underestimate the evidence that the domestic context is shaped by the international 
systemic factors. As seen in the earlier chapters, it is precisely because of the lack of attention to 
the systemic level that prevents the existing constructivist accounts from treating identity as a 
relational and therefore a fluid entity that constantly interacts with others and renew itself as the 
social context changes. As a result, Berger’s and Katzentein’s work does not seem to reflect the 
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recent “normalization” of Japanese security policy based on changes in the state identity. The 
model presented in this study overcomes such a setback in the existing account by taking the 
form of holistic constructivism and presents the internal contestation process as a causal 
mechanism between the changes in the international security environment (exogenous shocks) 
and the identity shift (endogenous change). 
 Last but not least, the “mosaic” picture of identity presented by this model complicates a 
dominant assumption in all paradigms of IR, namely, that state actors are monolithic entities with 
coherent sets of interests. I have illustrated that how, in the dynamics of internal contestation, a 
hegemonic identity group emerges and incorporate perspectives of other groups in a subordinate 
fashion in constructing the whole-identity that can be best described as a mosaic of multiple 
discourses. As we have seen in the earlier chapters, Japan’s identity has accommodated multiple 
identity groups’ discourses despite their different visions of national interest and identity: the 
mercantilist and the pacifist discourses during the Cold War and the normalist and 
internationalist discourses after the Cold War. It is this mosaic nature of identity that has allowed 
me to adequately account for a Japanese security policy that cannot be explained by a one 
identity vision, i.e. the mercantilist Yoshida strategy that incorporated pacifism in maintaining 
the minimalist armed forces and security role, and the recent normal security policy that, despite 
its strengthening of military capabilities and international security role, still adheres to a civilian 
approach in assuming that role and does not use forces to pursue its own interests. Moreover, if 
we think about the quotidian reality of politics, the mosaic metaphor should not be so surprising. 
Just as we make adjustments and compromises to come to an agreement in any political 
processes when our interests and proposals conflict one another, so do we when coming to a 
consensus on what the interest and identity of our nation should be.  
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 And yet, this more enlightened (and perhaps commonsensical) portrait of state identity 
does not seem to be so prevalent in the field of IR theory that presupposes state actors as 
monolithic entities with coherent sets of interests. It goes without saying that rationalists trap 
themselves in such a unitary actor assumption as they leave states as a black-box. This 
misleading assumption, however, is not only unique to the rationalist but is widespread in 
ideationalist or constructivist accounts. Following the “third-image” perspective of neorealism, 
systemic constructivism, on the one hand, focuses solely on interactions between “imaginary” 
unitary state actors. Ignoring what happens within the domestic political realm, it explains world 
politics simply by theorizing how states socialize one another in the external, international 
domain. According to the systemic accounts, there is a social structure to international politics, 
constituted by norms, ideas, and meanings that have “intersubjective” qualities. States acquire 
identities through such intersubjectivities that are constituted by the social structure of 
international politics.
204
 Therefore, little attention is paid to the intrastate arena, where 
contestation among competing visions of national interest and identity produces the mosaic 
nature of state identity; states are treated as monolithic actors. 
 On the other hand, unit-level constructivism does investigate the intrastate process of 
identity construction by concentrating on the relationship between domestic social and legal 
norms and the identities and interests of states. It is problematic, however, that this form of 
constructivism attempts to account for the sources of state identity by attributing to one 
overarching socially dominant norm, e.g. Berger’s and Katzenstein’s accounts of the “culture of 
antimilitarism” in Japanese case. This move has somewhat homogenizing effects in that their 
characterization of the cultural norm represents Japan’s identity solely based on that norm, rather 
than the aggregate of the alternative visions of multiple identity groups. However, as seen in the 
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earlier chapters, it was the combination of mercantilist and pacifist norms that had comprised 
Japan’s postwar identity during the Cold War. This is why its identity was a mosaic of “merchant 
nation” and “peace nation.” 
 Accordingly, to fully appreciate the mosaic nature of state identity, one needs to start 
questioning the dominant assumption in all paradigms of IR that state actors are monolithic 
entities with coherent sets of interests. This move may result in a less parsimonious and elegant 
account of state behavior than the existing IR theory. And yet, it has the merit of a more 
exhaustive analysis of identity construction that can help us explain what may appear as residual 
behavior based on the monolithic picture of identity. 
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Conclusion 
 In this thesis, I have addressed two puzzles regarding the state’s security policy: (1) 
Japan’s minimalist military posture despite its economic power during the Cold War and (2) the 
recent shift from this minimalist security policy to an assertive one marked by a strengthening of 
its international security role and military. I have argued that although many IR scholars, mainly 
from the realist camp, claim that the formation of the original security policy (puzzle 1) and its 
following transformation (puzzle 2) is driven by the state’s rational response to external 
conditions of the international security environment, it can more adequately be explained by the 
complex dynamics of internal contestation among identity groups with different visions of 
Japan’s identity and interest. The culmination of this contestation process is what I call an 
“identity crisis,” in which a new dominant, or hegemonic, identity group emerges and 
incorporates perspectives of other subordinate groups, constructing the state identity as a 
“mosaic” of multiple discourses.  
 I have illustrated that the first identity crisis happened in the aftermath of the World War 
II, in which there were three competing part-identities—pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist. 
The outcome of this contestation was that the mercantilist camp emerged as a hegemonic identity, 
incorporated the pacifist principles into its foreign policy, and presented the state as a “merchant 
nation” and a “peace nation” under the Yoshida Doctrine, a grand strategy comprising both 
mercantilism and pacifism. This doctrine (1) prioritized economic development, (2) minimized 
the state’s defense spending and international security role and (3) led the state to rely on the U.S. 
for its security. The doctrine ultimately set Japan on a path to becoming a peaceful economic 
power rather than a great military power.  
 However, the new security challenges that emerged after the end of the Cold War 
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convinced the domestic political actors that the existing state identity was no longer sustainable. 
The extant mercantilist identity evolved into a new part-identity, internationalist, and another 
new part-identity, normalist, emerged in the place of the revisionist one, while the pacifist 
identity group faded away from the political forefront. Consequently, Japan is currently 
undergoing a second identity crisis, in which the normalist camp has emerged as a new 
hegemonic identity while incorporating elements of the internationalist perspectives in a 
subordinate fashion. This new dynamic of contestation shifted Japan’s whole-identity to one 
characterized as a “normal nation” that has a greater international security role and military 
capabilities, but also as a “global civilian power” that emphasizes its use of force for 
humanitarian noncombat missions in promoting the world’s peace and security rather than for an 
aggressive pursuit of its national interests. Therefore, the new security policy is more nuanced 
than pure militant realism, and the new national identity less militaristic than a muscular, 
“normal” Japan defined by realists. 
 The model of identity construction which I have laid out in this thesis is applicable not 
only to Japan but also to any other countries as their domestic actors have competing views of 
national identity and interest. In fact, there are similar accounts of identity formation in the IR 
literature, though it does not necessarily use the language of constructivist theory. For instance, 
many scholars have identified in the U.S. identity discourse what they call an “identity 
dichotomy” consisting of “exemplary” exceptionalism (an isolationist posture exemplified by 
Puritan John Winthrop’s “City upon a Hill” speech and George Washington’s warning against 
“permanent alliances” in his farewell address of 1796) and “missionary” exceptionalism (an 
internationalist posture exemplified by Woodrow Wilson’s mission to make the world safe for 
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democracy).
205
 Some of these scholars have described that American foreign policy is cyclical, 
i.e. swinging like a pendulum between isolationism and internationalism.
206
 Others have argued 
that isolationism dominated the early years of U.S. foreign policy, whereas internationalism 
conclusively won after the country entered into the Second World War.
207
 While which argument 
offers more convincing accounts is not a matter to be discussed in this thesis, these past studies 
suggest the applicability of my model to countries other than Japan. Therefore, by applying my 
model to other case studies, we might be able to achieve more interesting, exhaustive, and 
complex understanding of world politics and potentially expand the boundaries of the existing IR 
theories.  
My model, however, is by no means a conclusive answer to how we should 
conceptualize and analyze identity as a variable. It rather problematizes the ways in which we 
think of the concept and proposes areas in which future research is needed. For instance, 
constructivists have introduced identity as an alternative to, or the basis of, interests that are 
hitherto assumed as given and fixed. And yet, the fluid aspect of identity highlighted in my 
model demonstrates that we need to treat identity not only as an independent variable to interests 
(a dependent variable), but also as a dependent variable subjected to changes in external 
conditions of the international system (an independent variable). This dual aspect of identity as a 
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variable demonstrates the true meaning of the constructivist intervention in IR theory, namely, 
that structure and agency are “mutually constructed,” warning us against treating identity as 
given and requiring us to pay close attention to the identity construction process. 
The fluidity of identity also raises the importance of the concept’s relational aspect, 
which needs further examination. I have illustrated that identity is relational in that domestic 
actors constantly form competing visions of national identity based upon their different 
interpretations of the country’s changing relationship to other states. This relationality in a 
self/other, systemic sense, I have demonstrated, leads to the fluidity of identity. Meanwhile, my 
empirical analysis seems to suggest that identity is also relational in a historical sense. That is to 
say, domestic actors construct their visions of national identity partly based on their different 
readings of the country’s history. Put differently, these visions are re-articulations of a self that 
are based on the different interpretations of the past self and that are projected onto the future 
(i.e., what the self should become in the future). For instance, during the Cold War, Japanese 
domestic actors formed the pacifist and mercantilist visions by reflecting on the devastating 
consequence of Japan’s prewar militarism. The collective memory of Japan’s past may be fading 
away as time passes and generational changes happen. However, it is still possible that domestic 
actors reflect on the current militaristic normalization in terms of the past tragedy, as efforts to 
preserve the war memory continue today. Furthermore, neighboring states in Asia can also 
prompt this remembrance of history. For instance, China and South Korea accuse Japan of not 
truthfully facing its past aggression when Japanese politicians make controversial visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals of World War II are honored. Such replays of the records 
of history could have a significant impact on the ways in which Japanese domestic actors seek to 
redefine their country’s national identity. This point also raises the role of recognition in identity 
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formation at the systemic level; whether an acceptance or a rejection of a self’s identity 
articulation by others (e.g., China rejecting Japan’s “normal nation” vision by evoking the war 
memory and repentance among the Japanese and in the international community) could influence 
the self’s identity formation. Further research could explore these dual faces—systemic and 
historical—of the relational aspect of identity. 
Lastly, I would like to conclude by noting the political significance of Japan’s ongoing 
normalization, as this redefinition of national identity could determine the country’s international 
standing for the decades to come. As the new Prime Minister Abe, at the time of writing, is again 
promoting the issues of constitutional revision as one of his priorities for this year’s upcoming 
Upper House election, a nationwide discussion on the definition of Japan’s “normalcy” is an 
urgent matter. While I have attempted to account for this normalcy as a mosaic of two visions 
held by the normalists and internationalists, it is ultimately in the hands of Japanese domestic 
actors to decide what kind of a “normal” nation Japan will become. Therefore, it is my sincere 
hope that my thesis inspires and contributes to further public discussions on the country’s new 
role in the rapidly evolving international security environment. 
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